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EYES ON A CLIMATE PRIZE:REWARDING ENERGY
INNOVATION TO ACHIEVE CLIMATE STABILIZATION
Jonathan H. Adler*
Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at double their pre-in-
dustrial levels (or lower) will require emission reductions far in excess of what can
be achieved at a politically acceptable cost with current or projected levels of tech-
nology.  Substantial technological innovation is required if the nations of the world
are to come anywhere close to proposed emission reduction targets.  Neither tradi-
tional federal support for research and development of new technologies nor tradi-
tional command-and-control regulations are likely to spur sufficient innovation.
Technology inducement prizes, on the other hand, have the potential to significantly
accelerate the rate of technological innovation in the energy sector.  This Article
outlines the theory and history of the use of inducement prizes to encourage and
direct inventive efforts and technological innovation and identifies several compara-
tive advantages inducement prizes have over traditional grants and subsidies for
encouraging the invention and development of climate-friendly technologies.  While
no policy measure guarantees technological innovation, greater reliance on induce-
ment prizes would increase the likelihood of developing and deploying needed tech-
nologies in time to alter the world’s climate future.  Whatever their faults in other
contexts, prizes are particularly well suited to the climate policy challenge.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 2, 2007, eccentric billionaire Richard Branson announced
the “Virgin Earth Challenge,” a $25 million prize for the development of “a
commercially viable design which results in the removal of anthropogenic,
atmospheric greenhouse gases so as to contribute materially to the stability
of Earth’s climate.”1  Encouraged by the success of the Ansari X-Prize, a
$10 million award for the development of a reusable, manned spacecraft,
Branson sought to promote investment in technologies that could reduce the
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. This Article was prepared for the Rethinking the
Foundations of Climate Change Law and Policy workshop, sponsored by the Program on Law,
Environment, and Economy at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, October 23, 2009.
The author would like to thank Howard Chang, Erik Jensen, Jason Johnston, Brian Mannix,
Andrew Morriss, and Craig Nard for comments on various drafts of this Article, and Lisa
Peters, Aaron Babb, and Daniel Smith for their research assistance.  Any errors, omissions, or
inanities are solely those of the author.
1 VIRGIN EARTH CHALLENGE, http://www.virgin.com/subsites/virginearth/ (last visited
Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter VIRGIN EARTH
CHALLENGE].
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threat of climate change.  Branson’s hope is that offering a sufficiently large
financial reward will spur inventors and researchers to focus their efforts on
the development of climate-friendly technologies.
Branson’s announcement was a media event, and with good reason.
The Virgin Earth Challenge’s $25 million bounty was the largest technology
inducement prize in history.2  Former Vice President Al Gore and noted
ecologist James Lovelock both endorsed the effort.3  Could it also serve as a
model for serious climate change policy?
No private individual will solve the climate challenge single-handedly.
While $25 million may be the largest inducement prize ever offered for a
technological innovation, it is a small fraction of what the U.S. government
spends annually on energy and climate-related technological research.4
Spurring the technological innovation necessary to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases will take far more.  Nonetheless, induce-
ment prizes are a promising tool for climate change policy.
Global climate change is a terribly vexing environmental problem.5  Its
scope, complexity, and potential costs are daunting.  Without concerted ef-
forts by nearly all industrialized and industrializing nations to drastically
reduce net greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, atmospheric concentrations
will likely grow to double those of pre-industrial levels before century’s
end.6  President Barack Obama and congressional leaders have endorsed an
ambitious target for GHG emission reductions of eighty percent by the year
2050.7  Meeting this goal would require that the United States emit less car-
bon dioxide than at any point in nearly a hundred years, while simultane-
ously accommodating a much larger and much wealthier population.8  This
will be exceedingly difficult to do, both practically and politically.  And yet,
2 James Owen, Scrub CO2 From the Air, Win $25 Million — But How?, NAT’L. GEO-
GRAPHIC NEWS, Feb. 16, 2007 (stating that the Virgin Earth Challenge is the “biggest science
prize in history”), available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070216-
virgin-earth.html; VIRGIN EARTH CHALLENGE, supra note 1.
3 VIRGIN EARTH CHALLENGE, supra note 1; see also Kevin Sullivan, $25 Million Offered
In Climate Challenge, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2007, at A13.
4 In 2006, the U.S. government appropriated just under $3 billion to fund research and
development of technologies related to climate change policy. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, STRATEGIC PLAN 219–20 (Sept. 2006), avail-
able at http://www.climatetechnology.gov/stratplan/final/index.htm [hereinafter USCCTP].
5 Professor Richard Lazarus has dubbed climate change a “super wicked” problem.  Rich-
ard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liber-
ate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).
6 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYN-
THESIS REPORT [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT].  The IPCC is
an international body created by the United Nations Environmental Programme and World
Meteorological Organization “to provide an authoritative international statement of scientific
understanding of climate change.” History, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml (last visited Dec. 2,
2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
7 See The Obama-Biden Plan, Agenda, Energy & Environment, CHANGE.GOV http://
change.gov/agenda/energy_and_environment_agenda/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library).
8 See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. R
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stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs will require even greater
efforts, particularly if developing countries are to be afforded an opportunity
to grow.9
If the United States is to come anywhere close to the “80 by 50” target,
let alone the reductions necessary for atmospheric stabilization, substantial
innovation in energy and climate-related technologies is necessary.10  Noth-
ing short of a clean energy revolution will be capable of meeting this emis-
sion target while maintaining or achieving acceptable standards of living
throughout the world.  And yet, there is reason to doubt whether such inno-
vation is something the dominant policy tools can deliver.  Patent protection
provides an insufficient incentive to develop technologies to address com-
mon pool problems like global atmospheric pollution,11 and neither tradi-
tional federal support for research and development of new technologies12
nor traditional command-and-control regulations are likely to spur sufficient
innovation.13  Nor is there reason to believe a proposed cap and trade system
will do the trick.14  Such tools have not shown themselves capable of affect-
ing dramatic technological innovation. Could prizes be different?
Technology inducement prizes have a long and storied history.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European governments
used prizes to reward inventors and stimulate desired innovations.15  Impor-
tant advances in navigation, food preservation, and air travel were spurred
by technology inducement prizes.16  However, over time, prizes fell out of
favor and were eclipsed by other innovation polices, including ex ante grants
and patents.17  Most technology inducement prizes today are funded pri-
vately; government prizes still exist, but they are relatively few and far be-
tween.18  Instead, most federal support for technological advance comes in
the form of government grants.
The dominant innovation policy tools have their merits.  They also have
significant limitations, particularly for inducing more than incremental tech-
nological advance.  In the climate change context, grants, regulatory con-
trols, and intellectual property are likely to be insufficient to generate
desired levels of invention, innovation, and diffusion.19  Traditional govern-
9 See infra Part I.
10 See id.
11 See infra notes 107–110 and accompanying text. R
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See infra notes 280–282 and accompanying text. R
15 See infra notes 111–136 and accompanying text. R
16 See infra notes 117–138, 148–152 and accompanying text. R
17 See infra notes 139–147 and accompanying text. R
18 See infra notes 153–192 and accompanying text. R
19 See Joseph Alois Schumpeter, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 2d ed.
(David R. Henderson ed., 2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/
Schumpeter.html; see also Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, Technolog-
ical Change and the Environment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, 464–65
(Karl-Göran Maler & Jeffery R. Vincent eds., 2003) (distinguishing between invention, “the
first development of a scientifically or technically new product or process,” innovation, “when
the new product or process is commercialized” or “made available on the market,” and diffu-
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ment research subsidies have produced relatively little in this area,20 and it is
particularly difficult to drive substantial technological advance through regu-
latory measures.21  Patent awards may well provide ample incentive for inno-
vation in other contexts, but absent other interventions, they provide
insufficient incentive for the development of climate-friendly technologies.22
There is, at present, no meaningful economic incentive to develop technolo-
gies that reduce GHG emissions or remove carbon from the atmosphere.
Meeting the climate policy challenge will require policymakers to ex-
pand their policy toolkit.  Spurring technological innovation requires some-
thing more ambitious, and yet more simple, than the traditional tools
deployed most often today.  If the goal is to spur needed innovation of the
sort that might make various greenhouse GHG targets achievable, policy-
makers should reconsider the use of technology inducement prizes.  Prizes
are particularly well-suited for the climate policy challenge because the
threat of global warming cannot be reduced by any meaningful degree with-
out dramatic technological breakthroughs that enable reductions in atmos-
pheric concentrations of GHGs, and traditional innovation tools are
inadequate.  Patent protection provides ample incentive to innovate in many
areas, but not where, as here, there is no direct economic benefit to be de-
rived from relevant inventions.  Specifically, because the atmosphere is, for
all practical purposes, a global, open-access commons, there is no price on
GHG emissions, no direct economic incentive to reduce such emissions, and
consequently no meaningful market for GHG emission-reducing technolo-
gies.23  Without such a market, there is little economic incentive to pursue
patents in this area.24  Prizes can fill the gap by providing the promise of
supercompetitive returns for the development of climate-protecting innova-
tions.  Whatever their faults in other contexts, prizes are particularly well
suited to the climate policy challenge.
To enhance the incentive for the development of climate-friendly tech-
nologies, the federal government should shift a substantial portion of cli-
mate-related research and development funding from grants to prizes.
Instead of doling out billions to researchers in the hope that they will invent
sion, when an innovation becomes “widely available for use in relevant applications through
adoption by firms or individuals”).
20 See infra Part IV.
21 See infra Part V.
22 On the use of intellectual property to spur environmentally friendly technologies, see
generally Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protec-
tion, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193 (1991).
23 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING THE FUTURE MAGNITUDE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 104
(2010) (noting the lack of markets for  emission-reducing technologies) [hereinafter NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING]; David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 ANN. REV. RE-
SOURCE ECON. 275, 277–78 (2010).
24 Little economic incentive does not mean no economic incentive.  There could be other
economic benefits from technological innovations that reduce emissions, such as increased
energy efficiency, and some may pursue emission-reducing technologies in the hope that such
innovations will become valuable at some future date at which emission controls or prices on
carbon dioxide emissions are imposed.
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something that will help solve the global warming challenge, the govern-
ment should offer substantial rewards to those who invent or develop tech-
nologies that solve particular climate-related problems.  While no policy
measure guarantees technological innovation, greater reliance on induce-
ment prizes would increase the likelihood of developing and deploying
needed technologies in time to alter the world’s climate future.
Part I of this Article outlines the challenge posed by climate change and
highlights the need for dramatic levels of technological innovation if atmos-
pheric stabilization targets are to be achieved.  Part II outlines the theory
behind the use of inducement prizes to encourage and direct inventive efforts
and technological innovation.  Part III briefly surveys the use of inducement
prizes beginning in the eighteenth century and discusses some of the reasons
prizes went out of favor with governments and scientific societies.  Ac-
cepting the need for government policies to encourage technological innova-
tion, Part IV explains the comparative advantages of inducement prizes over
traditional grants and subsidies for encouraging the invention and develop-
ment of climate-friendly technologies, while Part V explains why regulatory
tools, whatever their other merits, cannot be expected to produce sufficient
levels of technological innovation and may even hamper such efforts.  Part
VI considers some of the practical questions to be considered in designing
and implementing a system of prizes for climate policy, and is followed by
some concluding thoughts.
I. THE CLIMATE POLICY CHALLENGE
Scientists believe that human activity is having a significant effect on
the global climate system.25  Anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and
other GHGs,26 largely due to the burning of carbon-based fuels, have caused
a dramatic increase in the concentration of such gases in the atmosphere.27
This increase has contributed to a gradual increase in global mean tempera-
tures.28  The most recent report of the United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) concluded that it was “very likely” that
such human activity was responsible for a majority of the warming observed
25 For a brief and accessible summary of the science of global climate change, see William
Collins et al., The Physical Science behind Climate Change, SCI. AM., Aug. 2007, at 64.
26 Other GHGs of particular concern are methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, per-
fluorocarbons, and sulfur hexaflouride.
27 See Collins, supra note 25. R
28 Even many so-called “skeptics” accept the premise that human activity is contributing
to a gradual warming of the atmosphere, even if they reject apocalyptic projections of the
likely consequences. See, e.g., PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., CLIMATE OF
EXTREMES: GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCE THEY DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 11–20 (2009).  The
case for taking action to address rising atmospheric concentrations of GHGs need not be pre-
mised upon apocalyptic climate projections. See, e.g.,  ROGER PIELKE, JR., THE CLIMATE FIX:
WHAT SCIENTISTS AND POLITICIANS WON’T TELL YOU ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING (2010);
Jonathan H. Adler, Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change, SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y, July 2009, at 296–98.
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during the latter part of the 20th Century.29  The IPCC further predicted that
the global mean temperature will continue to rise over the next century, as
much as several degrees Celsius, as atmospheric concentrations of GHGs
continue to rise.30
In 1992, the United States and other nations agreed to the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, which established the goal
of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at a level that avoids
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”31  While
there is no agreement as to what level of atmospheric concentration of
GHGs this goal entails, most scientists believe a stabilization target of be-
tween 450 and 550 parts per million (“ppm”) of carbon dioxide (or its
equivalent), if not lower, will be necessary to avoid an average global tem-
perature increase of two degrees Celsius and the most negative effects of
global climate change.32  The emission reductions necessary to achieve this
goal “could require Herculean effort” on the part of both developed and
developing countries.33  By some estimates, developed country emissions
will need to decline “by a factor of 10 or more on a per capita basis . . . .”34
Yet even reductions of this scale would not leave developing nations much
room to increase their emissions.  Member nations of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) could reduce their
29 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007–THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 665 (2007) (“Greenhouse gas forcing has very likely caused most of the
observed global warming over the last 50 years.”).
30 Id. at 749.
31 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, opened for signature May 9,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164.
32 See, e.g., S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem
for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968 (2004) (“Proposals to limit
atmospheric CO2 to a concentration that would prevent most damaging climate change have
focused on a goal of 500 +/- 50 parts per million (ppm), or less than double the preindustrial
concentration of 280 ppm.”). Some organizations advocate a significantly lower target of 350
ppm. See, e.g., 350.org, http://www.350.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library); see also Andrew C. Revkin, Campaign Against Emissions Picks
Number, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at A8.  To some degree, all rounded numerical stabiliza-
tion targets are arbitrary. See, e.g., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007–MITIGATION.  CONTRIBU-
TION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 42 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
IPCC, MITIGATION], (“Limited and early analytical results from integrated analyses of the
costs and benefits of mitigation indicate that these are broadly comparable in magnitude, but
do not as yet permit an unambiguous determination of an emissions pathway or stabilization
level where benefits exceed costs.”); Richard S.J. Tol, Europe’s long-term climate target: A
critical evaluation, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 424 (2007) (critiquing E.U. climate targets).
33 Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy
for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCI. 981, 981 (2002); see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING,
supra note 23, at 67 (2010) (noting difficulty of meeting 550 ppm atmospheric stabilization R
target).  According to Hoffert et al., simply “holding at 550 ppm is a major challenge.” Hoffert
et al., supra.
34 Björn A. Sandén & Christian Azar, Near-term technology policies for long-term climate
targets: economy wide versus technology specific approaches, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 1557, 1558
(2005).
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GHG emissions to zero, and developing nation emissions alone would still
lead to atmospheric levels above 450 ppm by mid-century.35  In short,
achieving state climate stabilization goals “requires a technological and eco-
nomic revolution.”36
The scope of the climate stabilization challenge can be illustrated by
considering the “80 by 50” emission reduction goal — 80% emission reduc-
tions by the year 2050 — endorsed by the Obama Administration and some
Congressional leaders.37  “80 by 50” is far short of the emission reductions
necessary for atmospheric stabilization at 450 ppm, yet would still require
dramatic technological change.  “80 by 50” requires capping domestic emis-
sions at a little over one billion tons per year in 2050 — a level of emissions
not seen in the United States in nearly a century.  According to Department
of Energy statistics, annual emissions were last at one billion tons of carbon
dioxide around the year 1910, when the nation still had fewer than 100 mil-
lion people and per-capita income was approximately $6,200 per year (in
2008 dollars).38  By 2050 the U.S. population is expected to exceed 400 mil-
lion.39  Therefore, per capita emissions would need to be less than one quar-
ter what they were a century ago to meet even this intermediary target — a
goal that cannot be reached without dramatic technological change.  To fur-
ther illustrate this point, consider that replacing all coal burning in the
United States with natural gas through 2020 would only reduce carbon diox-
ide emissions by 16%.40  Wind and solar power production would have to
35 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2008 14
(2008).
36 John Alic et al., A new strategy for energy innovation, 466 NATURE 316, 316 (2010)
(“Limiting the concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmos-
phere requires a technological and economic revolution.”); see also Scott Barrett, The Coming
Global Climate-Technology Revolution, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 53 (2009) (“stabilizing concen-
trations will require a technological revolution – a ‘revolution’ because it will require funda-
mental change, achieved within a relatively short period of time.”); Scott Barrett, Kyoto and
Beyond: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 (2006); Gary
E. Marchant, Sustainable Energy Technologies: Ten Lessons from the History of Technology
Regulation, 18 WIDENER L.J. 831, 831 (2009) (“[I]t will not be possible to minimize these
environmental stresses while still providing an adequate standard of living without new,
cleaner technologies.”); Nancy Birdsall & Arvind Subramanian, Energy Needs and Efficiency,
Not Emissions: Re-framing the Climate Change Narrative 13–14  (Ctr. for Global Dev., Work-
ing Paper No. 187, 2009) (concluding that “any prospect of meeting the aggregate global
emissions target, consistent with developing countries not sacrificing their energy needs, will
require massive, revolutionary, improvements in the technology margins (production and con-
sumption) — far greater than seen historically ”); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING, supra note
23, at ix (noting that reducing GHG emissions while accommodating economic growth will R
“require scientific and engineering genius”).  Even those who argue that the climate challenge
can be met in the near-term by “scaling up what we already know how to do” concede that
“revolutionary technologies” will be necessary for atmospheric stabilization.  Pacala &
Socolow, supra note 32, at 968. R
37 See The Obama-Biden Plan, supra note 7. R
38 Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Waxman-Markey: An Exercise in Unreality,
AEI ENERGY AND ENVTL. OUTLOOK, July 2009, at 1, 3.
39 Id.
40 See PIELKE, supra note 28, at 101. R
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increase twenty-five-fold to achieve equivalent emission reductions,41 and
this is still not enough to meet the “80 by 50” target, let alone stabilization.
Meeting GHG emission reduction goals will require a “radical transforma-
tion of the energy system . . . .”42
The demands of atmospheric stabilization could be even greater than
traditional analyses suggest.43  Emission reduction scenarios are typically
based upon projections developed by the IPCC.  Yet the IPCC may have
“seriously underestimated” the degree of technological innovation necessary
to achieve climate stabilization.44  A 2008 report in Nature found that the
IPCC’s emission projections assumed a substantial amount of “spontaneous
technological change,” representing “two-thirds or more of all the energy
efficiency improvements and decarbonization of energy supply required to
stabilize greenhouse gases,” would occur independent of the adoption of any
climate or energy policies.45  These assumptions could be unduly optimis-
tic.46  Among other things, the IPCC predicted a greater decline in energy
intensity than has been observed thus far in the 21st century47 and assumed a
41 Id.
42 Sandén & Azar, supra note 34, at 1558. R
43 See Robert D. Atkinson & Darrene Hackler, Ten Myths of Addressing Global Warming
and the Green Economy, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION (June
2010) (“[T]he magnitude of change needed is much larger than many realize[;] many con-
ventional solutions simply won’t achieve the global scale needed.”), available at www.itif.org/
files/2010-green-economy-myths.pdf.
44 Roger Pielke Jr., Tom Wigley & Christopher Green, Dangerous Assumptions, 452 NA-
TURE 531, 531 (2008).
45 Id; see also IPCC, MITIGATION, supra note 32, at 218–20 (noting that the baseline sce- R
narios already assume a significant degree of technological change and technology diffusion).
46 See Pielke, Wigley, & Green, supra note 44, at 532: R
Enormous advances in energy technology will be needed to stabilize atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations at acceptable levels.  If most of these advances occur
spontaneously, as suggested by the scenarios used by the IPCC, then the challenge of
stabilization might be less complicated and costly.  However, if most decarboniza-
tion does not occur automatically, then the challenge to stabilization could in fact be
much larger than presented by the IPCC.
A widely cited paper by Pacala and Socolow asserting that existing technologies are suffi-
cient to “solve the carbon and climate problem in the first half of this century” adopts simi-
larly rosy assumptions.  Pacala & Socolow, supra note 32, at 968.  For example, Pacala and R
Socolow assume there will be only 1.5 percent annual growth in carbon emissions in their
business-as-usual scenario. Id.  Yet in the years since their study, emissions growth was
double that rate. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION - HIGH-
LIGHTS, 2009 ed. 9 (2009) (global carbon dioxide emissions increased by 3 percent from
2005–2006 and 2006–2007).  Further, Pacala and Socolow ignored the costs of their proposed
emission reduction measures, see Pacala & Socolow, supra note 32, at 969 (“our focus is not R
on costs”) and acknowledged that the ultimate goal of atmospheric stabilization would still
require the development of “revolutionary technologies” for which “enhanced research and
development would have to begin immediately.” Id. at 968.  It is also important to remember
that, in actual practice new technologies are “likely” to “fall short of their technical poten-
tial.”  ‘NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING, supra note 23, at 67. R
47 See Pielke, Wigley & Green, supra note 44, at 532. R
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level of emission-free power far above what current technologies can pro-
vide.48
Technological innovation is necessary to make climate stabilization
achievable and affordable.  So long as reducing GHG emissions remains
costly, most nations are unlikely to act.49  The price tag associated with lim-
its on GHG emissions has discouraged enactment of any meaningful emis-
sion control policies in the United States.  European nations have been more
willing to make commitments, but, thus far, they have not been any more
willing than the United States to bear meaningful economic costs in order to
achieve GHG emission reductions.  Several Kyoto signatories are already
behind in reaching their targets.50  Those nations that have met their Kyoto
Protocol targets benefitted from exogenous factors or policy changes.51  For
the rest, emission reductions have been promised, but not yet achieved.52
Overall, global GHG emissions have continued to climb.  Emissions of car-
bon dioxide from fuel combustion, for example, increased 38% between
1990 and 2007, despite various pronouncements that countries were begin-
ning to address GHG emissions.53
The resistance to costly controls in developing nations is even greater.
In 2008, nearly 1.5 billion people around the world lacked access to electric-
ity, including 809 million in Asia.54  For affected nations, electrification is
understandably a greater priority than emission reductions.  China and India,
48 See Hoffert et al., supra note 33, at 981.  Given current technological capabilities, and R
the prospective costs of meaningful climate change policies, “we are not likely to see dramatic
reductions in global net emissions for some time.” Id.
49 Roger Pielke Jr. posits an “iron law of climate policy” such that “when policies fo-
cused on economic growth confront policies focused on emissions reductions, it is economic
growth that will win out every time.” PIELKE, supra note 28, at 46. R
50 See Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/2875.php (last visited
Dec. 2, 2010) (listing Greece, Canada, Bulgaria, and Croatia policies as under questions of
implementation) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also Robert W. Hahn,
Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 557, 566 (2009)
(reporting that “a few signatories are already having trouble filling their Kyoto
commitments”).
51 Hahn, supra note 50, at 566 (noting that the choice of 1990 as the base year has made it R
easier for some nations to meet Kyoto targets due to exogenous factors); Thomas Heller, The
Path to EU Climate Change Policy, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND EU ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY 108, 120 (Jonathan Golub ed., 1998) (noting decline of CO2 emissions in eastern Europe,
including the former East Germany, was due to population decline and economic transition out
of Soviet economic system).
52 See PIELKE, supra note 28, at 106 (the rate of decarbonization within EU countries was R
the same during the nine years prior to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as it has been since).
Emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol have not stopped European nations
from proceeding to build additional coal-fired power plants. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rosenthal,
Europe Turns Back to Coal, Raising Climate Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 (report-
ing that “European countries are expected to put into operation about 50 coal-fired plants over
the next five years, plants that will be in use for the next five decades”).
53 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION – HIGHLIGHTS 44
(2010), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf.
54 See Access to Electricity, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iea.org/weo/electricity.asp
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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the first and fourth greatest emitters of GHGs respectively, are essential to
any atmospheric stabilization plan and yet have made clear they will not
participate in any regime which would require them to forego future eco-
nomic growth.55  China, like the United States, may have more to lose than
to gain from carbon limits, as the costs of climate change may be out-
weighed by the costs of GHG emission controls, at least in the near to me-
dium term.56  Those nations that stand to lose the most from climate change,
on the other hand, are not particularly large emitters.57  Even if such nations
were willing to adopt costly emission control strategies, their participation
would not make a significant contribution to the ultimate goal of atmos-
pheric stabilization.
Reducing expected compliance costs is one way to make nations more
willing to impose environmental controls. The United States initially op-
posed international limitations on chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) and other
substances that contributed to stratospheric ozone depletion.  Yet as Ameri-
can manufacturers began to develop substitutes for CFCs, industry opposi-
tion declined, and the United States eventually agreed to the Montreal
Protocol and a phase-out of ozone-depleting substances.58  In this case, tech-
nological innovation helped shift the U.S. position on the desirability of an
otherwise-costly international agreement to control a form of atmospheric
pollution, both by reducing the costs of compliance and creating the possi-
bility that specific companies would gain competitive advantage due to the
imposition of environmental regulations.
Insofar as the United States and other developed nations can limit the
cost of GHG emission reductions in developing nations — or at least make it
55 See Ravi Nessman, India: Climate Deal Can’t Sacrifice Poor Nations, GUARDIAN (UK),
Oct. 22, 2009 (citing Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who notes, “[D]eveloping
countries cannot and will not compromise on development.”), available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8767757; Lionel Barber, Transcript: Wen Jiabao, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-11dd-8790-0000779fd2ac.html
(“[I]t’s difficult for China to take quantified emission reduction quotas at the Copenhagen
conference, because this country is still at an early stage of development.”) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library); see also Hahn, supra note 50, at 564 (“[T]here is no simple R
way to get major developing countries, such as India and China, to participate in an
agreement.”).
56 The research supporting this point is summarized in Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the
United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse
Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1678–90 (2008).  “The United States and China are the
largest emitters, and on prominent projections, they also stand to lose relatively less from
climate change.” Id. at 1688.
57 Cf. Robert Mendelsohn, Ariel Dinar, & Larry Williams, The Distributional Impact of
Climate Change on Rich and Poor Countries, 11 ENVT & DEV. ECON. 159, 173 (2006)
(“Overall, the poor will suffer the bulk of the damages from climate change, wheras the richest
countries will likely benefit.”).
58 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1694.  It is also important to note that some chemical R
producers saw the phase-out as a way to obtain or maintain competitive advantage. See id.
(citing DuPont’s “ability to develop relatively inexpensive substitutes” as cultivating an “in-
centive to favor aggressive regulation”); see also Daniel F. McInnis, Ozone Layers and Oli-
gopoly Profits, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 129, 150
(Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
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less expensive to slow projected emission increases — developing nations
may be more willing to accede to binding commitments and to pursue low-
carbon development paths.  At the same time, developed nations may also be
more willing to fund emissions reductions, carbon remediation projects and
low-carbon development in developing nations insofar as such projects are
made less expensive.  Again, the Montreal Protocol experience may be in-
structive.  Developing nations were more willing to accede to an interna-
tional treaty that would limit their access to low-cost refrigerants and
coolants once developed nations agreed to compensate them and take other
steps to reduce developing country compliance costs.59  Whatever other poli-
cies are adopted at this time, it makes sense to adopt measures designed to
increase the pace of development of climate friendly technologies, including
those that reduce GHG emissions, remove carbon from the atmosphere, or
enhance adaptive capacity.60
The level of technological innovation necessary to make atmospheric
stabilization an affordable — and therefore politically viable — proposition
is unlikely to happen without government intervention.  The competitive
pressures of a market economy provide firms with substantial incentives to
improve their efficiency.  These incentives often generate substantial envi-
ronmental improvements.  As firms learn to do more with less, they may
reduce their overall environmental impact.  Insofar as emissions are a conse-
quence of incomplete combustion, increased efficiency may reduce the
emission of particular pollutants.  Yet such incentives are unlikely to be suf-
ficient to produce significant GHG emission reductions.  Indeed, while pol-
lution trends for many substances have followed the inverted u-shape of the
“Environmental Kuznets Curve,” no such trend has been observed for car-
bon dioxide emissions — at least not yet.61  To the contrary, increased eco-
nomic growth has tended to correspond with increased emissions.62  Further,
59 See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1695–96. R
60 See Hahn, supra note 50, at 564 (“R&D expenditures should not only target mitigation R
efforts, but also increase our understanding of climate change and help identify cost-effective
methods for adaptation.”).
As Hoffert et al. observe: “Arguably, the most effective way to reduce CO2 emissions with
economic growth and equity is to develop revolutionary changes in the technology of energy
production, distribution, storage, and conversion.”  Hoffert et al., supra note 33, at 981; see
also Kenneth J. Arrow et al., A Statement on the Appropriate Role for Research and Develop-
ment in Climate Policy, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Feb. 2009, at 1 (“A key potential benefit of
focused scientific and technological research is that it could dramatically reduce the cost of
restricting greenhouse gas emissions by encouraging the development of more affordable, bet-
ter performing technologies.”).
61 For a summary of the literature on whether there is an observable “Environmental
Kuznets Curve” for carbon emissions, see Jody W. Lipford & Bruce Yandle, Environmental
Kuznets Curves, Carbon Emissions, and Public Choice, 15 ENV’T. & DEV. ECON. 417 (2010).
62 Id. at 421.
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the International Energy Agency projects that energy demand will continue
to increase substantially in the years ahead.63
Although GHG emissions, at some level, are tied to energy use, im-
provements in energy efficiency do not necessarily produce equivalent re-
ductions in GHG emissions.  Energy efficiency, measured in terms of energy
use per unit of GDP, has steadily increased for decades.  In the United
States, energy consumption per unit of GDP declined by over 50 percent
between 1970 and 2008.64  Yet these improvements do not necessarily trans-
late into equivalent GHG emission reductions.  While reducing the use of
carbon-based fuels should reduce the GHG emissions, increasing energy ef-
ficiency can reduce energy costs and result in an increase in energy use, and
an offsetting emissions increase.65  Alternatively, firms can reduce GHG
emissions without increasing energy efficiency, through methods such as
fuel switching.
In summary, climate change represents a major environmental policy
challenge, likely the greatest environmental policy challenge the world has
ever faced.  Dramatic technological improvements will be necessary if at-
mospheric stabilization of GHGs is to be achieved.  Such technological im-
provements, insofar as they lower the costs of reducing emissions or
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, could also facilitate the enactment of
further climate policy measures.  Technological innovation is essential to
meeting the climate policy challenge.  The question is how to induce it.
II. INNOVATION INDUCING PRIZES
Technology inducement prices are a promising way to enhance the de-
gree of technological innovation necessary for climate stabilization.  The
idea behind technology inducement prizes is simple: Economic incentives
are a powerful way to motivate human behavior toward a particular goal.  If
the goal is greater effort toward solving a particular problem, then one way
to achieve that goal is to provide economic rewards for individuals to act
accordingly.  Inducement prizes provide incentives for innovative effort by
offering rewards for pre-specified scientific or technological achievements,
such as the solution to a mathematical problem, a device or method to per-
63 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009 74 (2009) (presenting bus-
iness-as-usual reference scenario in which energy demand in 2030 is 40 percent greater than in
2007).
64 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 13 (2009), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf.
65 See STEVE SORRELL, THE REBOUND EFFECT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE FOR
ECONOMY-WIDE ENERGY SAVINGS FROM IMPROVED ENERGY EFFICIENCY vi (UK ENERGY RE-
SEARCH CENTRE 2007) (noting that energy efficiency improvements can produce a “rebound
effect” that results in an increase in energy usage of ten percent or more and that such factors
should be considered in policy analysis).
It is also important to keep in mind that carbon dioxide is not the only important GHG, and
that other GHGs are not directly tied to the combustion of carbon-based fuels.
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form a particular function within given parameters, or the completion of a
particular task.66  While some prizes — so-called “blue sky” prizes — may
be awarded, ex post, for innovations for which an award had not been estab-
lished ex ante, inducement prizes are targeted to achieve a specific goal.67
Prizes have some similarities with patents, but can also be used as a
complement to patent protection.  Assuming that a given innovation is valu-
able, both prizes and patents guarantee that a successful inventor will get an
economic return greater than that which would be obtained in a competitive
market.68  With intellectual property, the increased return is provided by the
monopoly right.69  Guaranteeing an inventor an intellectual property right in
her innovation enables her to charge a monopoly price and obtain monopoly
rents.  With prizes, the increased return comes from the financial value of
the prize.  In some cases, those pursuing a prize may also be motivated by
ego or the potential reputational gains from being the first to solve an impor-
tant or high-profile problem.
One virtue of the patent system that prizes simulate is decentraliza-
tion.70  Technological innovations, by their nature, often come from unfore-
seen sources and perspectives.71  More decentralized systems are better able
to draw from a wider pool of ideas and potential innovators.72  As a McKin-
sey & Company report on philanthropic prizes reported: “The history of
science is replete with instances of outsiders proposing novel and ultimately
66 See generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115
(2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights,
44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents,
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
67 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 41–42 (2004). Scotchmer re-
fers to ex ante prizes.
68 See Kenneth w. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 250 (1994) (noting that a “patent that reduces the cost of making a product will permit the
patentee to enjoy economic rent.  To be sure, this statement assumes that other producers are
not able to use the innovation to reduce cost, but that is precisely the purpose of the power to
exclude from ‘manufacture, use, and sale’ granted by a patent.”).
69 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 36 (“Intellectual property rights make the proprietor R
a monopolist.”).
70 See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPY-
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 66 (2005) (stating that in the
United States, patent “statutes from the earliest years ensured that the ‘progress of science and
useful arts’ was to be achieved through a complementary relationship between law and the
market in the form of a patent system”); Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual
Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1473, 1477 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (referring to decentralization in intellectual property systems as a
“virtue” and stating “[p]robably the most important obstacle to effective public procurement
is in finding the ideas for invention that are widely distributed among firms and inventors. The
lure of intellectual property protection does that automatically.”).
71 See Thomas Kalil, Prizes for Technological Innovation, Hamilton Discussion Paper
2006-08, The Brookings Institution (Dec. 2006), at 7 (“Many of the most interesting discover-
ies in science are serendipitous.”).
72 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 38; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., INNOVATION R
INDUCEMENT PRIZES AT THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 13 (2007) (“[C]ompared with
grant programs, prize programs may be expected to attract more individuals, informal teams,
and for-profit firms of various sizes and perhaps not as many academic institutions.”).
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revolutionary solutions to problems that had vexed insiders.”73  When it
comes to innovation, expertise is not always an advantage.  Indeed, in some
cases those with less expertise may be in better position to identify solutions
to difficult problems.74
Like traditional research and development (“R&D”) grants, govern-
ment supported prizes reward innovations that “are publicly valued but not
privately marketable.”75  In addition, by offering an award to all comers,
prizes encourage diverse research and innovation strategies, and allow for
the success of outliers.76  Indeed, a particular virtue of prizes is that they
facilitate the targeting of investment without forgoing an ability to draw
upon decentralized knowledge and alternative views of where innovation
may lead.77  With government research grants, on the other hand, a federal
agency typically determines the goal to be achieved, the means to achieve
that goal, and who will receive funding to pursue it.78 Inducement prizes
allow the government to establish a goal without being prescriptive as to
how that goal should be met or who is in the best position to meet it.79
Because technological innovation is unpredictable, can emerge from unex-
pected directions, and may involve a degree of serendipity, prizes have a
distinct advantage insofar as they do not preclude potentially promising di-
rections for innovation.80  Moreover, with prizes there is no need to apply for
73 MCKINSEY & COMPANY, “AND THE WINNER IS . . .”: CAPTURING THE PROMISE OF
PHILANTHROPIC PRIZES 23 (2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/social
sector/And_the_winner_is.pdf.
74 See Karim R. Lakhani et al., The Value of Openness in Scientific Problem Solving,
Harvard Business School Working Paper 07-050 (October 2006), at 9, available at http://
www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-050.pdf.
75 See William A. Masters, Prizes for Innovation in African Agriculture: A Framework
Document, version 2.0, 5 (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/prizes/Prizes-Frame
workDocument-RevJan2006.pdf [hereinafter Masters, Framework].
76 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 5. R
77 Utilizing decentralized knowledge about economic conditions is, in fact, one of the
central problems of any economic system. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 77–78 (1948) (“The peculiar character
of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowl-
edge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or inte-
grated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess . . . [o]r, to put it briefly, it is a problem
of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.”).
78 For a fuller discussion of government research grants, see infra Part IV.
79 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 5 (“[Prizes] help to blend the best of public purpose and R
the creativity, energy, and passion of private sector entrepreneurial teams.”).
80 According to William Baumol, “the independent innovator and the independent entre-
preneur have tended to account for most of the true, fundamentally novel innovations.”  Wil-
liam J. Baumol, Education for Innovation: Entrepreneurial Breakthroughs vs. Corporate
Incremental Improvements 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10578,
2004).  According to Michael Witherell, vice chancellor for research at the University of Cali-
fornia at Santa Barbara, “[m]ost of our great breakthroughs have not been through [top-down
government] funding.” See Gautam Naik, Energy Push Spurs Shift in U.S. Science, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 25, 2009 at A1.
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a government grant, comply with complex eligibility requirements, or ingra-
tiate oneself with grant-making authorities.81
Some analysts have argued that prizes are actually superior to intellec-
tual property.82 Like patents, prizes reward innovators in proportion to their
degree of innovation, but without some of the associate costs.  Specifically,
prizes provide a similar reward structure to patents without the offsetting
welfare loss from monopoly prices.83  If the prize is set at a level equal to the
value of a patent on the innovation, then the incentive to innovate will be
identical.84  If a prize is in addition to a patent — that is, if obtaining the
prize does not require giving up any intellectual property in the innovation
— then the prize serves to augment the incentive to innovate already pro-
vided by intellectual property protection.  Not seeking to match the prize to
the value of the patent avoids the problem of trying to determine, up front,
what the value of the patent might be.  (Indeed, setting the prize to a level
equal to the patent right with any precision may be impossible.85)
While much of the relevant academic literature discusses prizes as a
potential substitute for patent protection, the two need not be mutually ex-
clusive.86  To the contrary, prizes and patent protection can be complimen-
tary.  While patent protection provides a background inducement for all
commercially marketable innovations, prizes augment the reward for types
of innovations that have been identified, ex ante, as having particular social
value.87  Particularly in those areas in which patents alone are unlikely to
generate sufficient investment in innovative endeavors, such as where free-
rider or common pool problems discourage such investment, prizes can aug-
ment the power of intellectual property.  In the case of climate change, there
is a clear need for technological innovations that can make it less expensive
to reduce GHG emissions or remove GHGs from the atmosphere, but there
is as yet no real market for such technologies, making prizes a good comple-
ment for patents in this area.
81 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 38 (“The incentive operates without the inventor R
having to negotiate with an invention authority.”); MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 23 (“Com- R
pared with other incentive instruments, such as grants and scholarships, prizes reduce bureau-
cratic barriers to entry for participants and need not screen for conventional qualifications.”).
82 See, e.g., Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 66; Wright, supra note 66.  For one of the R
earliest arguments for replacing patents with government funded awards, see Michael Po-
lanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61 (1944).
83 See Wright, supra note 66, at 696; see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 39 (“The R
advantage of prizes over patents is that they can avoid the deadweight loss of proprietary
pricing.”).
84 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 41. R
85 See id.
86 See William A. Masters, Paying for Prosperity: How and Why to Invest in Agricultural
Research and Development in Africa, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 35, 60 (2005) (“[P]rizes for technologi-
cal achievements have often been used as a complement to patent rights and research con-
tracts.”) [hereinafter Masters, Prosperity].
87 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 6 (“[P]rizes are especially suitable when the goal can be R
defined in concrete terms but the means of achieving that goal are too speculative to be reason-
able for a traditional research program or procurement.”).
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Prizes have the capacity to stimulate increased investment in a given
technological problem from a wide range of sources.  Because the prize is a
competition, multiple innovators may invest in trying to obtain the prize,
accelerating the process of innovation.88  As a consequence, prizes “can
stimulate philanthropic and private sector investment that is greater than the
value of the prize.”89  For example, the Ansari X-Prize was only $10 million,
yet it stimulated over $100 million in private investment by teams seeking to
win the prize,90 in addition to substantial post-prize investments in private
space travel.91  While the Ansari X-Prize may not be typical, the experience
with prizes shows that governments or other benefactors can use prizes to
leverage an investment in technological innovation, inducing greater efforts
than could be purchased through contracts or grants.92  Competitors may also
be motivated by more than just the financial reward.93  Prestige and publicity
can also be valuable.94  Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen reportedly invested
more than double the value of the prize itself in the team that won the Ansari
X-Prize.95
Whether the potential for a prize to leverage the benefactor’s investment
is a feature or a bug depends on the extent to which one is concerned about
the costs of duplicated investment.  Prizes, more so than government grants,
may lead to duplication of effort, as more than one individual or group seeks
to obtain the prize.96  Yet such duplication of effort is also generated by the
patent system, as multiple firms or individuals seek to develop patents for
useful innovations in a given field.97  Indeed, such duplication of effort is
pervasive in the private marketplace, as multiple firms seek to develop prod-
ucts and services that will capture market share, attract customers, and ex-
88 See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439
(2004) (asserting that patent races bring about innovations more quickly).
89 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 7. R
90 MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 25. R
91 See, e.g., id. at 21.  By 2008 over 300 people had signed up for $200,000 trips on
SpaceShipTwo, the successor to the vehicle that won the Ansari X-Prize.
92 See id. at 25 (discussing leveraging of investment by NASA Centennial Challenge); id.
at 29 (“One of prizes’ great strengths is their ability to attract investments from competitors
many times greater than the cost of delivering and awarding a prize.”).
The leveraging feature of prizes is particularly important given the potential for research
grants to “crowd out” other R&D efforts.  As a consequence, increased R&D support in one
area does not necessarily result in a net increase of overall R&D efforts. See David Popp &
Richard G. Newell, Where Does Energy R&D Come From? Examining Crowding Out from
Environmentally Friendly R&D, NBER Working Paper 15423 (Oct. 2009), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w15423; see also Dominque Guellec et al., The Effectiveness of Public
Policies in R&D, 94 REVUE D’ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 49, 62 (2001) (Fr.) (discussing poten-
tial “crowding out” effect of public R&D funding on private R&D funding).
93 MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 19 (“Prizes also add additional layers of motivation be- R
yond money, such as prestige and intellectual curiosity.”).
94 Id. at 26 (“[T]he recognition accompanying a prize can be very valuable in itself.”).
95 See Masters, Framework, supra note 75, at 11. R
96 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 7. R
97 See Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation
Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25, 25 (2007) (noting the problem of potential
duplication of effort is the same under the patent system as it is under a prize system).
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pand their sales.  Prizes may encourage an inefficient duplication of research
costs.  This must be balanced against the increased likelihood of spurring the
desired innovation.  Such duplication may be an inevitable cost of techno-
logical progress.  If, as many analysts believe, the public and private sector
alike under-invest in climate and energy related R&D,98 the risk of duplica-
tion may also not be particularly great.
One value of the patent system that prize systems do not duplicate on
their own is the added incentive for commercialization of an innovation.99
The patent holder’s reward comes from turning the patent invention into a
commercially saleable product.  A prize winner, on the other hand, may re-
ceive the prize simply for the invention itself.  In order to avoid this potential
problem, prize specifications can include criteria to ensure potential market-
ability.  This also can be addressed through prize design, such as by requir-
ing the sale of an invented technology as a condition of winning the prize or
by guaranteeing government procurement of a winning technology.  Insofar
as prizes draw attention to the newly possible, generate interest in new mar-
kets, or increase the prestige of participants, however, the winning of the
prize itself may be enough to spur investment in commercially viable appli-
cations.100  The lack of an independent inducement for commercialization is
another reason to view prizes as complements, not substitutes, for intellec-
tual property.
Prizes can also be particularly important to spur investment in techno-
logical innovations that would be of primary benefit to low-income consum-
ers and people in developing nations.  Few profit-seeking firms are likely to
make significant investments in serving such markets.  This problem has
been observed in the agricultural context, where neither governments nor
private firms have invested significantly in developing technologies or tech-
niques of particular use to widely-dispersed, low-income consumers in de-
veloping nations.101  Similarly, not many firms see massive profit
opportunities in developing low-carbon energy options for developing na-
tions.  Yet the welfare benefits from improved energy efficiency and a less
carbon-intensive development path in much of the world could be quite
substantial.
Not all sorts of innovation can be effectively encouraged through
prizes, however.  In particular, the use of a prize mechanism is dependent
upon the initial identification of a particular problem that needs to be solved
or goal to be achieved.  As a consequence, prizes may be better suited for
98 See infra notes 193–200 and accompanying text. R
99 See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001).
100 See MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 21 (“There are many examples of well-crafted prizes, R
backed by a relatively small amount of capital, establishing the importance of a field, catalyz-
ing market demand, shaping public debate, and even changing the image of sponsors.”).
101 See Masters, Prosperity, supra note 86, at 56. R
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applied research than for basic scientific research.102  In some areas, it may
be difficult to identify prize terms or qualifications.  In the case of climate
change, however, at least some of what must be discovered and developed to
facilitate atmospheric stabilization is relatively clear.  While there may yet
be climate-friendly innovations that emerge from left field, many character-
istics of potential climate-related technologies can be identified today.
Setting the appropriate level for a prize can be difficult as well, particu-
larly if the prize is expected to substitute for patent protection.103  A prize
that is too small will fail to stimulate sufficient investment, but a prize that is
too high will waste resources.104  Of course, if the prize is set too low, and it
is insufficient to spur sufficient levels of research, the prize will not be
claimed, so the fiscal cost for a sponsoring government agency is zero.  In
such an instance, the government may have failed to spur valuable research,
but it will not have wasted taxpayer dollars on an unadvised investment.
Prizes may also be the subject of controversy, particularly if the criteria for
winning a prize are insufficiently clear or fail to account for possible means
of satisfying the prize requirements.
A potentially significant drawback of prizes is that researchers must
obtain funding for their research in order to compete.  From a fiscal policy
standpoint, this is a benefit, as funding prizes does not require the govern-
ment to appropriate money up front.105  Yet in fields in which research may
be capital intensive, the lack of upfront funding can be inhibitive.106  A theo-
retical mathematician may not have many fixed costs, but the same may not
be true for a scientist researching particle physics or even nuclear power
plant design.  If research toward a prize requires the construction of expen-
sive equipment, these costs may be a substantial barrier to participation.
This concern may justify retaining traditional grant-based funding for basic
research and for other particular types of research.  It does not, however,
undermine the broader case for prizes.
Whatever their drawbacks in other contexts, technology inducement
prizes are particularly well-suited for climate change policy.  The climate
policy challenge requires the development of technologies that can help
achieve particular goals, including low- or zero-carbon energy production
102 Cf. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 72, at 12–13 (“[Prizes] may be less well suited R
than grants and contracts to the development of basic scientific and engineering understanding
underlying the achievement of goals.”).
103 See Abramowicz, supra note 66, at 121 (“[T]he devil is in the details and the devil for R
the prize system is the government’s ability to dispense rewards accurately.”).
104 Wei, supra note 97, at 22 (“If the prize is too low, then the system will inadequately R
stimulate R&D investment.  If the prize is too high, then costs such as resource duplication and
the problem of favoritism will be exacerbated.”).
105 See Masters, Prosperity, supra note 86, at 61 (“The unique virtue of a prize program is R
to provide rewards ex post, letting other institutions provide the working capital.”).
106 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 72, at 13 (“The requirement in a prize contest that R
would-be innovators fund the research up front may inhibit participation by entities that do not
otherwise have access to discretionary funding for innovative activities.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 19 14-MAR-11 12:33
2011] Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize 19
and the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.107  The U.S. Climate
Change Technology Program has already identified key R&D priorities for
the short, medium, and long terms.108 Further, climate change policy de-
pends less upon additional basic research than the development and deploy-
ment of practical technological innovations, and the utility of such
innovations can be readily evaluated.  While there are substantial market in-
centives encouraging the development of environmentally friendly technolo-
gies in other contexts, the commons nature of the climate problem and lack
of a price on carbon emissions discourages optimal private investment in
climate-related innovation.  A firm that purchases a technology to reduce its
GHG emissions does not thereby reduce its operating costs.  As a conse-
quence, the financial value of the GHG reduction benefits.109  While there
are some technologies that may reduce emissions because they increase en-
ergy efficiency, the savings in such cases are a consequence of reduced en-
ergy use, and any emission reductions are incidental. This is one reason
many economists endorse government support for climate-related technolog-
ical innovation.110  The question is what form that government support
should take.  The history of technology inducement prizes — and their suc-
cessful deployment to solve pressing social problems — shows that they can
be a particularly effective way to spur research and development of socially
valuable innovations.
III. PRIZE HISTORY
Prizes for scientific and technological innovation used to be common.
In the eighteenth century, research grants, the current “staple of basic re-
search funding,” were relatively rare.111  Instead, European governments
used prizes to spur technological research and scientific progress.112  Prize
competitions were not only used to reward an innovator’s ability to solve a
107 See supra Part I.
108 See USCCTP, supra note 4.
109 See Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, Technological Change and
the Environment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 462, 473 (Karl-Göran
Maler and Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003) (noting that “the external social benefits of environ-
mentally benign technology are unlikely to be fully captured by private innovators”);
Marchant, supra note 36, at 833 (characterizing private efforts as unlikely to be “sufficient to R
generate the massive technology changes, fast enough, needed to meet the challenge of sus-
tainability, and therefore, public policies are needed to stimulate induced technological
change”).
110 Hahn, supra note 50, at 564; see also Kenneth J. Arrow et al., A Statement on the R
Appropriate Role for Research and Development in Climate Policy, 6 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1,
Feb. 2009, available at www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss1/art6/.
111 Robin Hanson, Patterns of Patronage: Why Grants Won Over Prizes in Science, 2
(July 28, 1998), http://hanson.gmu.edu/whygrant.pdf (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
112 See MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 15 (“For centuries, [prizes] were a core instrument R
of sovereigns, royal societies, and private benefactors alike who sought to solve pressing soci-
etal problems and idiosyncratic technical challenges.”).
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particular technological problem.  Historically, some prize competitions re-
warded the best contribution in a given area made by a set date.113  Prizes
were awarded for basic science as well as for technical advances, from top-
ics ranging from mathematics to food preservation, alkali production to air
travel.  Prizes spurred James Maxwell to develop a mathematical theory of
Saturn’s rings and encouraged Heinrich Hertz to figure out how to detect
radio waves.114  Not all prizes included monetary rewards.  In some cases,
the reputational gain of solving an announced problem was sufficient.115
Would-be prize-winning inventors needed to fund their own research, lead-
ing some to seek patronage and others to develop early venture-capital-like
investment financing schemes.116
The most famous prize in history is likely the longitude prize financed
by the British government in the early eighteenth century, and chronicled in
Dava Sobel’s book, Longitude.117  During the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies, sea travel and trade increased dramatically.  With this increase in sea-
borne trade came an increased demand for accurate navigational tools.  A
particularly perplexing problem for naval captains and merchants was how
to measure longitude at sea.  While determining latitude was relatively easy,
determining longitude was a problem “that stumped the wisest minds of the
world for the better part of human history.”118
In response to private and military demands, and rising discontent over
vessels lost at sea, the British Parliament enacted the Longitude Act in 1714,
establishing a series of prizes up to £20,000 for a “[p]racticable and
[u]seful” means for ship captains to determine longitude.119  The value of
the prize awarded to a given inventor would be a function of the accuracy of
the measurement method.120  Inventions and methods would be evaluated by
a Board of Longitude consisting of “scientists, naval officers, and govern-
ment officials,” which would also have the authority to provide additional
financial incentives to impoverished inventors with promising ideas.121
When the longitude prize was created, all assumed astronomy held the
key.  For centuries, scientists had looked to the stars for a solution to the
longitude puzzle.  The idea was intuitive and simple: if sailors knew that a
particular event, such as an eclipse or the appearance of a constellation, was
scheduled to occur at one time in one place, they could determine their loca-
tion based upon when they saw the event.  The idea worked in theory, but
astronomers lacked sufficient knowledge of star positioning and sailors
113 Hanson, supra note 111, at 5. R
114 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 9–10. R
115 See id. at 9.
116 See id. at 12–13.
117 DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE (1995).
118 Id. at 4.
119 Id. at 8.  Twenty thousand pounds sterling in 1714 would be worth “several million
dollars in today’s currency.” Id.
120 See id. at 53.
121 Id. at 54.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 21 14-MAR-11 12:33
2011] Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize 21
could not rely upon clear nights (or clear days to set their clocks by the noon
sun).  Despite decades of work by various luminaries, including Galileo, the
perfect algorithm to chart the stars remained elusive.122
The prize was eventually claimed not by an astronomer, but by a watch-
maker, John Harrison — and not without a struggle.  Harrison invented a
clock that “could withstand storms, changes in temperature, and salt air,”123
and provide an accurate measure of time that could be used to fix a ship’s
position at sea.  Although Harrison’s invention worked, the British Board of
Longitude initially refused to recognize it.124  The prevailing wisdom of the
time was that mechanical clocks were too unreliable and cumbersome for
timekeeping on an ocean voyage, let alone to position a ship at sea.  The
Board, which included several astronomers, wanted an astronomical solution
to the problem, such as an algorithm that would enable any ship with the
right charts to obtain its location.  Such an approach would have been more
of a “pure” public good solution to the longitude problem than the difficult-
to-produce clock that Harrison invented.125  Yet, in the end, Harrison’s
method was vindicated, even though he “stood alone against the vested
navigational interests of the scientific establishment.”126
That a clock, not an astronomical chart or algorithm, was the best way
to determine longitude was a surprise to Harrison’s contemporaries and gov-
ernment authorities.  Had Parliament sought to solve the longitude problem
with research grants for prominent astronomers, instead of a prize open to all
comers, it is doubtful it would have been solved and the British Empire
would not have seen the benefits of Harrison’s clock.  As it happened, Harri-
son’s innovation was revolutionary, and by 1815 there were thousands of
longitude clocks in use.127
The longitude prize is not an isolated example.  Throughout the eight-
eenth century, the French government and Royal Academy of Sciences of-
fered numerous prizes for scientific achievement.128  Many of these prizes
were simply honorific, conferring publicity and prestige, but not money,
upon the recipient.  The most prestigious of these was the gran prix,
awarded to “the best answer to a major scientific problem selected by a
group of expert members.”129  Over time, however, the Academy began of-
fering financial awards.  These prizes appear to have been quite effective,
particularly those in the field of mathematics.130  While some prizes went
122 See id. at 24–27.
123 SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 32. R
124 Id. at 32–33.
125 See id.
126 See SOBEL, supra note 117, at 99. R
127 Id. at 163.
128 Maurice Crosland & Antonio Gálvez, The Emergence of Research Grants within the
Prize System of the French Academy of Sciences, 1795–1914, 19 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 71, 71–72
(1989).
129 Id. at 74.
130 Id. at 75.
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unclaimed, or failed to induce much practical research, others led to break-
throughs in medicine and other fields.131  Even some of the prize awards that
failed nevertheless produced success, as they sometimes encouraged re-
search in otherwise neglected areas.  The 19th century Bréant Prize offered
for a cure for cholera was never claimed, but “the existence of the prize
encouraged work on other infectious diseases,” and led to some prize-wor-
thy discoveries.132
Among the most important of French prizes offered was that for the
production of alkali that could be used in glass, soap, and textiles.133  As
alkali became scarce in the late 18th century, King Louis XVI offered a
2,400 livre prize for a simple and economical method of producing alkali
from sea salt.134 Nicolas Leblanc, whose innovation laid the foundation for
the inorganic chemical industry in the 19th century, claimed the prize.135  In
1795, the French government offered a prize for improved food preservation
techniques, a technology much desired by the French military.136  The prize
was awarded to Nicholas Appert in 1810.137  Remarkably, Appert’s innova-
tion, a method of sterilizing and preserving food in bottles, is still used to-
day.138  And as with the longitude prize, the offer of a reward (and prestige)
led to a socially desired innovation.
Despite their success in the 18th and 19th centuries, prizes gradually
fell out of favor.  Retrospective prizes, in which scientific societies gave
unannounced ex post awards to innovators for particularly notable achieve-
ments (much like the contemporary Nobel Prize), and research grants gradu-
ally replaced innovation prizes and the sponsorship of “in-house” funding of
gifted scholars and scientists.139  It also became more acceptable to reward
scientists repeatedly and give grants to those with connections to the scien-
tific establishment.140  Hanson reports, “As a result of these changes, the
patronage of basic research came to rely more heavily on the judgment and
trustworthiness of those administering the funding process.”141
It is often assumed that the shift away from prizes toward grants and
direct funding of scientific research was an advancement.  Historians of sci-
131 Id. at 92.
132 Id.
133 Masters, Framework, supra note 75, at 7; see also David M. Kiefer, It Was All about R
Alkali, TODAY’S CHEMIST AT WORK, Jan. 2002, available at http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/
archive/tcaw/11/i01/html/01chemchron.html.
134 Masters, Framework, supra note 75, at 7. R
135 See Lee Davis, How Effective Are Prizes as Incentives to Innovation? Evidence from
Three 20th Century Contests, DRUID Summer Conference: Industrial Dynamics, Innovation
and Development, May 7, 2004, at 4.
136 SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 43. R
137 Wright, supra note 66, at 704. R
138 SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 44. R
139 See Hanson, supra note 111, at 6. R
140 See id. at 6 (citing Jack Sommer, Radical Proposal for Reorganizing Research Sup-
port: Lotteries, Prizes, THE NEW SCIENTIST (June 10, 1991), at 11 (noting the tendency to
award grants based upon reputation instead of a proposal’s merit)).
141 Hanson, supra note 111, at 6. R
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ence “have mostly lauded this transition” to paying for effort instead of
paying for results.142  Increased reliance on research grants left researchers
with greater control over their research efforts, and ex ante funding of re-
search made it easier to build and maintain larger research facilities and
maintain equipment.  It also reinforced the gradual professionalization of
scientific research.
More recent research has challenged the conventional explanation for
why prizes have fallen out of favor.  One reason researchers and scientific
societies alike preferred grants was because direct grants made “life easier
for the government bureaucrats” who oversee support for scientific research,
as well as for “the scientists who received them.”143  Both grants and general
retrospective awards “gave judges more discretion in choosing winners” and
made it possible for scientific societies to reward “insiders.”144  This created
the opportunity for patrons to reward their friends and allies and ensure that
only those with the right ideas received funding.
As government became an ever-larger source of science funding, the
shift away from prizes continued.  Today, most prizes are privately funded,
while most government-supported scientific research comes in the form of
research grants.145  Reviewing the trends, Hanson suggests that “[g]rants
may have won not, as their advocates claimed, because they were a superior
institution, but instead because non-local and non-autocratic governments
tended to prefer them.”146  According to Hanson, “governments might prefer
grant-like funding to prize-like funding because they were susceptible to dis-
tributive pressures from leaders of scientific societies, who preferred the
‘pork’ of increased discretion over the money that passed through their
hands.”147
Prizes did not disappear; there was just less government involvement.
Privately funded prizes were essential for the development of air travel.
Several million dollars worth of aviation prizes were awarded in Europe
prior to World War I, and significant prizes were offered in the United States
as well.148  Gregg Maryniak of the X-Prize Foundation identified over fifty
aviation prizes offered between 1900 and 1913.149  The 1919 Orteig Prize
involved a $25,000 reward for the first nonstop flight between New York
142 Id.
143 David Leonhardt, You Want Innovation? Offer a Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at
C1.
144 Hanson, supra note 111, at 9. R
145 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 72, at 10 (noting that prizes “have been used only R
sparingly by governments”).
146 Hanson, supra note 111, at 17. R
147 Id. at 18.
148 See Gregg Maryniak, When Will We See a Golden Age of Space Flight?, in SPACE: THE
FREE-MARKET FRONTIER 11, 20–22 (Edward L. Hudgins ed., 2002) (identifying aviation prizes
offered between 1900 and 1913); see also ALEX SCHROEDER, INDEPENDENCE INST., THE APPLI-
CATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF INDUCEMENT PRIZES IN TECHNOLOGY 7, (2004) (citing esti-
mate of $1 million in prizes offered in 1911 alone).
149 Maryniak, supra note 148, at 20–22. R
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and Paris.150  According to the conventional wisdom of the time, such a feat
could only be accomplished by a sizable crew in a large, multi-engine
plane.151  Yet the prize was won by Charles Lindbergh, who made a solo
flight in a small, single-engine plane, after several others had failed.152  Like
Harrison before him, Lindbergh claimed the prize by challenging the con-
ventional wisdom and pursuing an independent path.  As with longitude, an
ex ante award of a research grant focused on the method most “experts”
thought would be successful, would have failed.
The 1990s saw a “renaissance” of prize awards, largely funded by phi-
lanthropists and private companies.153  RSA Security offered a $250,000
prize for the specification of a 2048-bit integer, which could then be used for
encryption software.154  Netflix offered a $1 million prize for improvements
to the company’s Cinematch algorithm that identified movies customers
were likely to enjoy based upon their and other customers’ reactions to other
movies.155  Specifically, Netflix said it would award the prize to a team or
individual who developed an algorithm that would predict viewer ratings of
movies with at least ten percent greater accuracy than Cinematch.156  Over
55,000 entrants from 186 different countries entered the Netflix competi-
tion.157  In September 2009, three years after the prize was proposed, Netflix
awarded the prize to BellKor’s Pragmatic Chaos, a team of seven program-
mers.158  The company was so pleased with the results that it has announced
a second prize.  This time Netflix is seeking an algorithm that will make
predictions based upon demographic data, and the prize will be awarded to
those teams with the best algorithm at set time periods.159
More famously, the X-Prize Foundation created the “Ansari X-Prize,”
an award of $10 million for the private development of a reusable, manned
spacecraft.160  In 2004, a team bankrolled by Microsoft co-founder Paul Al-
150 Kalil, supra note 71, at 6. R
151 Id.
152 Id.; see SCHROEDER, supra note 148, at 7–8. R
153 SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 44; see also MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 16 (noting R
“prizes are booming once again” and citing an increase in prizes since 2000); Eric S. Hintz,
Creative Financing: The Rise of Cash Prizes for Innovation Is a Response to Changing Busi-
ness Conditions - And a Return to Winning Strategy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2010, at R8
(reporting on the rise of prizes for innovation).  In 1972, President Richard Nixon proposed the
use of prizes to “foster useful innovation.” Harry Goldsmith, An Olympiad of Science, 177
SCI. 35, 35 (1972).  Congress never acted on this proposal.
154 SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 45. R
155 Leonhardt, supra note 143. R
156 See The Netflix Prize Rules, NETFLIX, http://www.netflixprize.com/rules (last visited
Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
157 And the winner is . . ., THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2010.
158 Harrison Hoffman, Netflix Awards $1 Million for Outdoing Cinematch, THE WEB SER-
VICES REPORT (Sept. 21, 2009, 3:28 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13515_3-10357807-26.
html (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
159 Id.
160 See And the winner is . . ., supra note 157; John J. Miller, Extraordinary Feats of an X- R
Man, PHILANTHROPY, July 2005, available at http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/article.
asp?article=750&paper=1&cat=147.
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len claimed the prize for their SpaceShipOne, which managed to make two
suborbital flights in less than two weeks.161  Although only $10 million was
awarded, the prize spurred over $100 million in privately funded research,162
including over $20 million by the benefactors of the winning team.163  The
X-Prize demonstrated that spaceflight can be far less costly than the typical
National Aeronautic and Space Administration (“NASA”) mission would
suggest.164  It generated a far greater return per dollar spent than the federal
space program and is leading to the commercialization of space flight.165  It
was recently reported that Virgin Galactic, a fledgling space tourism com-
pany, “has already collected 45 million dollars in deposits from more than
340 people who have reserved seats” aboard a spaceship that will be able to
take passengers into suborbital space beginning in 2012.166
Due to the success of this prize, the X-Prize Foundation has announced
others, including the Progressive Automotive X Prize, to encourage the de-
velopment of vastly more fuel-efficient vehicles.167  This prize includes a
“units sold” metric.168  The Progressive Automotive X Prize offered a $10
million purse for a long distance stage competition for vehicles that can ex-
ceed 100 miles per gallon.169  The prize was awarded in September 2010 to
three teams, out of over 100 competitors, one of which produced a vehicle
capable of achieving the equivalent of 205 miles per gallon.170  The X-Prize
Foundation expects to announce several more multi-million dollar prizes in
the coming years.171
The federal government has also shown a renewed interest in prizes,
beginning with a 1999 National Academy of Engineering (“NAE”) report
encouraging government agencies to consider using technology inducement
161 See Peter Pae, Rocket Takes 1st Prize of a New Space Race, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004,
at A2.
162 MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 25.  The 2004 Defense Advanced Research Projects R
Agency (“DARPA”) Grand Challenge is another example, as contest entrants invested an esti-
mated total of $55 million in pursuit of a $2 million prize. See Miller, supra note 160. R
163 Masters, Framework, supra note 75, at 11; Pae, supra note 161 (reporting Allen in- R
vested $25 million in SpaceShipOne).
164 See David L. Chandler, Final Frontier: Space Tourism Prize Gives Space Tourism a
Boost, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2004, at B9.
165 See Virgin Spaceship to Pass New Milestone, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 22, 2010,
available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101022/ts_alt_afp/usaviationspacebritainvirgin_
20101022091717 (reporting on maiden flight of spacecraft for commercial spaceflight).
166 Id.
167 See And the winner is . . ., supra note 157.  For additional details on this prize, see R
PROGRESSIVE AUTOMOTIVE X PRIZE, http://progressiveautoxprize.org (last visited Dec. 2,
2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
168 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 13. R
169 See And the winner is . . ., supra note 157. R
170 See Joseph B. White, No Radio, but It Gets 100 Miles a Gallon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
2010, at A3.
171 See MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 30 (noting aim of launching ten prizes over 5–7 R
years).
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prizes on an experimental basis.172  NASA and the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (“DARPA”) have experience with awarding prizes
for technological innovation, though both agencies’ programs have been de-
signed on a rather small scale.173  DARPA, the research agency within the
Department of Defense, “has offered a $1 million prize to elicit a fortyfold
improvement in robotic vehicles for rough terrain.”174  Congress recently au-
thorized NASA to sponsor prizes out of its budget, as well as to accept pri-
vate matching funds for prize rewards.175  NASA’s “Centennial Challenge”
provides for several prizes to encourage more private investment in space-
related technological innovation.176  An unemployed engineer won NASA’s
Astronaut Glove Challenge in 2007 — yet another example of a prize stimu-
lating innovation by an “outsider.”177
Congress has shown some renewed interest in prizes in recent years.178
In 2006 Congress permitted the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) to
begin utilizing “innovation inducement prizes” with portions of its annual
appropriations.179  In response, the NSF arranged with the National Academy
of Sciences (“NAS”) for a study on how the NSF could administer prizes to
“achieve novel solutions to specified social or research needs or capitalize
on recognized research opportunities.”180  The resulting report, published in
2007, summarizes the benefits and limitations of technology inducement
prizes and makes recommendations for prize administration and topic selec-
tion.181  Of note, the report concluded there are “many possibilities for em-
ploying innovation inducement prizes to overcome technical and scientific
challenges in low-carbon energy supply, demand, and storage
technologies.”182
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the Secretary of Energy to
offer cash prizes of up to $10 million for “breakthrough achievements in
research, development, demonstration, and commercial application” for en-
ergy-related innovations, as well as additional “Freedom Prizes” for innova-
tions that reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil.183  The Freedom Prizes will
award over $4 million to “the most effective and sustainable initiatives in oil
172 NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, CONCERNING FEDERALLY SPONSORED INDUCEMENT PRIZES IN
ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE (1999); see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 72, at 11 (credit- R
ing increase in prizes to NAE report).
173 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 18; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 72, at 10. R
174 SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 2. R
175 Kalil, supra note 71, at 8. R
176 MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 86. R
177 Id. at 23.
178 For a summary of congressionally authorized prizes, see DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., FEDERALLY FUNDED INNOVATION INDUCEMENT PRIZES (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40677.pdf.
179 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2318 (2006).
180 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 72, at vii. R
181 See generally id.
182 Id. at 42.
183 Kalil, supra note 71, at 12. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 27 14-MAR-11 12:33
2011] Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize 27
displacement (permanent reduction in oil dependency) using existing tech-
nologies and efficiency strategies.”184  In 2006, the House of Representatives
also passed the H-Prize Act to authorize $70 million in prizes for advance-
ments in hydrogen energy.
The Obama Administration has shown interest in the use of prizes as
well.185  On April 30, 2010, the White House hosted a summit on “Promot-
ing Innovation: Prizes, Challenges and Open Grantmaking,” that featured X-
Prize Foundation CEO Peter Diamandis.186  This summit was preceded by
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) guidance to federal agencies
on the use of challenges and prizes to spur technological innovation.187  The
guidance memorandum announced that it was Administration policy to
“strongly encourage” federal agencies to “[u]tilize prizes and challenges as
tools for advancing open government, innovation, and the agency’s mis-
sion.”188  It further explained that many federal agencies have sufficient stat-
utory authority to create technology inducement prizes with existing funds
and spending authorizations.  Specifically, the OMB noted that NASA and
the Departments of Defense and Energy possess statutory authority to “di-
rectly administer prize competitions and use appropriated funds to provide
the prize purse.”189  Existing statutes also authorize NASA and the Depart-
ment of Energy (“DOE”) to select third parties to administer prize competi-
tions, and NASA and the NSF are permitted to obtain private outside funds
to underwrite prize competitions.190  Where agencies simply have authority
to issue grants or enter into cooperative agreements, such authority may be
sufficient to fund cash prizes for competitions, so long as such expenditures
184 THE FREEDOM PRIZE, http://www.freedomprize.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
185 For example, prizes were briefly mentioned in a September 2009 Obama Administra-
tion white paper on spurring technological innovation. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, OFFICE OF SCI.
& TECH. POLICY, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: DRIVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH AND QUALITY JOBS, 17 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/docu
ments/SEPT_20__Innovation_Whitepaper_FINAL.pdf.  During the 2008 presidential cam-
paign, Republican candidate John McCain also proposed using prizes to spur innovation in
electric car battery technology. See Jonathan H. Adler, A Prize for McCain, NATIONAL RE-
VIEW ONLINE (June 23, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/224850/prize-
mccain/jonathan-h-adler (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
186 See Beth Noveck, Live from the White House Summit on Promoting Innovation
through Prizes, Challenges, and Open Grantmaking, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 30, 2010, 11:36
AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/30/live-white-house-summit-promoting-inno
vation-through-prizes-challenges-and-open-gran (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
187 Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Zienst, Deputy Director for Management, Office of
Management and Budget, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 8, 2010)
(on file with author) [hereinafter OMB Memo]; see also Federal Agencies Encouraged to
Offer Grand Challenges and Prize Contests, SCI. CAREERS BLOG (Mar. 15, 2010), http://blogs.
sciencemag.org/sciencecareers/2010/03/federal-agencie.html (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
188 OMB Memo, supra note 187, at 2. R
189 Id. at 5.
190 Id. at 5–6.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 28 14-MAR-11 12:33
28 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35
are otherwise consistent with an agency’s existing authorizations.191  The
OMB also concluded that agencies may use prizes to meet statutorily de-
fined agency missions.192  Taken as a whole, the OMB Memo authorizes
agencies to use prizes in pursuit of their statutorily defined authorities and
could lead to a significant increase in prize activity by the federal
government.
IV. PRIZES VS. GRANTS
There is broad agreement that additional funding of energy-related re-
search and development will be necessary to spur the technological innova-
tion necessary to reduce GHG emissions.193  According to one estimate, the
United States spends on the order of $3 billion annually on climate-related
R&D.194  Yet both public and private investment in such R&D has declined
over the past few decades,195 as has the number of patents issued for energy-
related technologies.196  While federal energy R&D spending increased sig-
nificantly in 2007 and 2008, it remains well below historic levels.  Energy
R&D accounted for approximately 25 percent of nondefense federal R&D
spending in 1980, but it was less than three percent in 2008.197  Federal en-
191 Id. at 6.
192 Id. at 6–7.
193 See Hahn, supra note 50, at 583 (“It is fashionable to call for a large increase in R&D R
funding.”); Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, Time to ditch Kyoto, 449 NATURE 973, 974 (2007)
(“[I]nvestment in energy R&D should be placed on a wartime footing. This is a cause that
embraces the political spectrum . . . .”); David Leonhardt, A Climate Proposal Beyond Cap
and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at B1 (noting that increased funding in clean energy
research has “a growing list of supporters” across the political spectrum).  For an example of
cross-ideological support for increased clean energy research, see STEVEN F. HAYWARD ET AL.,
POST-PARTISAN POWER: HOW A LIMITED AND DIRECT APPROACH TO ENERGY INNOVATION CAN
DELIVER CHEAP ENERGY, ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY, AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY (2010),
available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/Post-Partisan-Power-Hayward-101310.pdf, a recent re-
port co-authored by analysts at conservative and liberal think tanks calling for increased en-
ergy R&D funding as an alternative to regulatory measures to address climate change.
194 USCCTP, supra note 4, at 17.  Some sources claim it is more than $4 billion. See R
Richard G. Newell, The Energy Innovation System: A Historical Perspective, in ACCELERAT-
ING ENERGY INNOVATION: INSIGHTS FROM MULTIPLE SECTORS (Rebecca Henderson & Richard
Newell eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 13), available at www.nber.org/chapters/c11747.pdf.
195 Gregory F. Nemet & Daniel M. Kammen, U.S. Energy Research and Development:
Declining Investment, Increasing Need, and the Feasibility of Expansion, 35 ENERGY
POL’Y 746, 746 (2007) (“Investment in innovation in the U.S. energy sector is declining just as
concerns about the environmental, geopolitical, and macroeconomic impacts of energy produc-
tion and use are intensifying.”).  Of note, energy R&D funding has declined while overall
R&D funding has increased. Id. at 747; see also A.D. Sagar & J.P. Holdren, Assessing the
Global Energy Innovation System: Some Key Issues, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 465, 467 (2002) (not-
ing decline in public and private energy-related R&D funding).
196 See Nemet & Kammen, supra note 195, at 749–50; see also Alic et al., supra note 36, R
at 316 (“Many analysts in the United States have pointed to underinvestment in R&D by the
US Department of Energy (DOE) since the 1980s as a symptom and cause of slow energy-
technology development.”).
197 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING, supra note 23, at 120 (noting decline in energy R
R&D as percentage of non-defense federal spending from 1980 to 2008).
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ergy R&D may inch higher, and the Department of Energy’s Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency-Energy (“ARPA-E”) may receive a larger share of
the available funds, but dramatic increases in public funding for research are
unlikely.198  The question at this point is less whether there should be more
R&D funding, but the form such funding should take — and, in particular,
whether the continued reliance upon traditional R&D funding mechanisms
will be sufficient to meet the climate policy challenge.199
Traditional grant-driven funding for research and development has sev-
eral limitations.200  First, decisions about projects or efforts to fund are cen-
tralized, limiting the range of promising ventures that may receive funding
and increasing the risk that research funding will not result in useful techno-
logical innovations.  As the history of prizes detailed in the prior section
shows, valuable technological innovations often come from surprising direc-
tions.  Second, with ex ante grants, the government pays for R&D whether
or not the R&D produces anything of value in return.  Third, traditional
grant funding is more subject to political pressure and may create negative
incentives among researchers.  Like traditional R&D grants, government-
supported prizes reward innovations that “are publicly valued but not pri-
vately marketable.”201  Yet prizes do not suffer from these other drawbacks.
Therefore, the federal government should reallocate portions of existing en-
ergy-related R&D funding from traditional research grants to the creation of
technology inducement prizes.
Allocating grant money effectively requires the grant-making entity to
pick “winners” and “losers,” something the government has rarely done
well.202  This is particularly difficult to do when the awarding agency is not
198 ARPA-E was created in 2009 to spur greater technological innovation in the energy
sector.  Modeled on the DARPA within the Department of Defense, ARPA-E received an ini-
tial $15 million appropriation in FY 2009, and an additional $400 million in stimulus funding,
but received no regular appropriations in FY 2010. See Katie Howell et al., DOE: White
House boosts nuclear, basic science funding, GREENWIRE, Feb. 1, 2010.
199 See Newell, supra note 194, at 1: R
[P]ublic resources are likely to be substantially constrained going forward given
the current long-term fiscal outlook in the United States and elsewhere.  This reality
prompts additional questions: First, what options realistically exist for funding ex-
panded investments in energy technology innovation?  Second, what institutions are
best positioned to direct and oversee publicly funded technology programs?
At the time of this writing it also appears that the Obama Administration is backing away
from its pledge to “invest $150 billion over ten years in energy research and development.”
See Andrew C. Revkin, The Case of the Missing Climate Pledge, DOT EARTH (Aug. 19,
2010, 11:25 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/the-case-of-the-missing-
climate-pledge/ (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
200 See Alic et al., supra note 36, at 316 (“[I]t is doubtful whether DOE-funded R&D R
alone can catalyse the type of innovation needed”).
201 See Masters, Framework, supra note 75, at 5. R
202 See JOHN A. ALIC ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S. TECHNOLOGY
AND INNOVATION POLICIES: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 18–19 (2003), available at http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/US%20Technology%20&%201nnovation%20Policies%20
(pdf).pdf (“Where government has sought to define technical attributes or design features and
‘pick winners’ in the marketplace, failure has been a common outcome.”).
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the primary “customer” of the technological solution that is to be funded.203
Supporters of increased R&D funding often point to the successes of the
Manhattan and Apollo projects as examples of successful, government-di-
rected research.204  Yet these are poor models for the climate technology
challenge.205  As Mowery, Nelson, and Martin note, both “were designed,
funded and managed by federal agencies to achieve a specific technological
solution for which the government was effectively the sole ‘customer.’” 206
In the climate context, there is no single technology that will solve the prob-
lem, nor is there a single “customer” to satisfy.207  Meeting the climate pol-
icy challenge will require the development and adoption of multiple, cost-
effective technological innovations that are capable of satisfying consumers
(or governments) the world over.208
Federal funding of science is worthwhile, particularly for basic scien-
tific research.209  Yet federal R&D money rarely produces commercially via-
ble technologies or dramatic technological innovation.210  This is particularly
true for agencies that are not themselves consumers of the innovations they
are trying to stimulate.  The Department of Defense’s procurement process
may stimulate a significant degree of innovation because those defense con-
tractors that develop technological breakthroughs may be rewarded with siz-
able contracts.  There is competition for the contracts and innovation is
rewarded.  The Department of Energy, on the other hand, is not a significant
consumer of the technology it funds.211  Indeed, the Department of Defense
203 See David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson & Ben R. Martin, Technology Policy and
Global Warming: Why New Policy Models Are Needed (or Why Putting New Wine in Old
Bottles Won’t Work), 39 RES. POL’Y 1011, 1012 (2010).
204 See, e.g., John M. Amidon, America’s Strategic Imperative: A “Manhattan Project” for
Energy, JOINT FORCE Q., Autumn 2005 at 68; Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate
Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 73, 73 (1998); Thomas L. Friedman, Bush’s
Waterlogged Halo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at A25 (calling for a Manhattan Project for
developing alternatives for energy independence); Why Do We Call It the Apollo Alliance?,
APPOLO ALLIANCE, http://apolloalliance.org/about/why-do-we-call-it-the-apollo-alliance/ (last
visited Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
205 See, e.g., Chi-Jen Yang & Michael Oppenheimer, A “Manhattan Project” for Climate
Change?, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 199, 199, 203 (2007) (calling for increased R&D efforts but
not under a Manhattan Project “style of governance”).
206 Mowery, Nelson & Martin, supra note 203, at 1012. R
207 Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 19, at 489 (noting that technology diffusion has R
been slow in a “variety of disciplines” because “potential technology adopters are heteroge-
nous, so that a technology that is generally superior will not be equally superior for all poten-
tial users . . . .”).
208 See Mowery, Nelson & Martin, supra note 203, at 1013 (noting there was no “technol- R
ogy adoption” issue with either the Manhattan or Apollo projects); see also Newell, supra note
194, at 3–4 (noting need for economic incentives, including market demand, for innovation R
and diffusion of technology).
209 But see TERENCE KEALEY, THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 344–45
(1996) (questioning value of any government support for science, including basic research).
210 See Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 19, at 473 (“Examples of successful govern- R
ment technology development (as opposed to research) have been particularly few.”).
211 See Alic et al., supra note 36, at 316 (“The DOE neither buys nor sells goods or R
services based on energy and climate innovations.  It therefore has few incentives to manage
R&D in accord with marketplace needs rather than scientific norms.”).
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may be better positioned to encourage energy innovation through its pro-
curement process than is the DOE with traditional R&D grants.212  Insofar as
this is so, it is because a competitive procurement process can induce inno-
vation by offering a substantial financial reward for significant
breakthroughs.
Direct federal investment R&D expenditures tend to be less productive
than private sector investments.  One reason for this is that federal agencies
tend to develop “organizational stove pipes” that reinforce “risk-averse, pa-
rochial views” about what sorts of technologies are worth funding.213  As a
result, notes one Department of Energy official, “Government R&D dollars
will tend to flow to marginal ideas.”214  Government R&D funding often
goes to support relatively mature technologies rather than those projects
more likely to spur needed innovation.215
Government grants are also subject to various regulations and reporting
rules that inflate costs and may discourage the participation by some re-
searchers.216  Prizes, on the other hand, may “attract teams with fresh ideas
who would never do business with the federal government because of pro-
curement regulations” or other bureaucratic obstacles217 and may be “more
likely to reach innovators who happen to be good at R&D or diffusion, but
are perhaps not very skilled at documenting their work.”218
Given their limitations, it should not be all that surprising that govern-
ment efforts to stimulate innovation through R&D subsidies have not borne
much fruit.219  The Synthetic Fuels Corporation is but one of many energy-
related projects that failed to produce returns sufficient to justify the invest-
212 See id. at 317 (“The DOD is better placed for catalysing rapid innovation in energy
technologies than the DOE because the DOD is a major customer for energy-consuming sys-
tems and equipment for its roughly 500 permanent installations, as well as for operational
equipment . . . .”).
213 Benjamin K. Sovacool, Replacing tedium with transformation: Why the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy needs to change the way it conducts long-term R&D, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 923,
926 (2008) (quoting former DARPA director F.L. Fernandez).
214 Jerry Taylor & Peter VanDoren, Soft Energy Versus Hard Facts: Powering the Twenty-
First Century, in EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 147 (Ron-
ald Bailey ed., 2000) (citing Department of Energy, Energy Research Advisory Board member
Eric Reichl).
215 See, e.g., Michael Jefferson, Accelerating the Transition to Sustainable Energy Sys-
tems, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 4116, 4119 (2008) (noting subsidy support for “mature renewable
energy technologies, which should be able to prosper without [it]”).
216 See Naik, supra note 80, at A1 (noting concerns about high administrative costs in R
federal energy R&D).
217 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 7. R
218 Masters, Prosperity, supra note 86, at 61. R
219 See Newell, supra note 194, at 3 (“substantial public investments in alternative energy R
have by and large not yielded game-changing technological advances that would allow for a
fundamental shift in the distribution of primary energy sources”).  A 2001 NAS report examin-
ing Department of Energy research concluded that some of the Department’s energy efficiency
research had been worthwhile, and that the overall portfolio of DOE energy research produced
a positive return, largely due to substantial benefits from a handful of projects. See NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCI., ENERGY RESEARCH AT DOE: WAS IT WORTH IT? ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
FOSSIL ENERGY RESEARCH 1978 TO 2000 5–8 (2001).
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ment, at a cost of over $4 billion.220  Again, there may be an economic case
for government support for basic scientific research, but traditional innova-
tion-oriented fossil fuel R&D programs cannot be justified on those grounds.
While innovation requires risk taking, politically controlled agencies
have a difficult time accepting failure and terminating programs.221  Once
grants have been allocated, the recipient has an interest in keeping the
money flowing, even if it will not produce positive returns.  As Linda Cohen
and Roger Noll found, substantial political pressure to continue R&D pro-
grams remains long after it is clear they have failed.222  At the same time, the
political process has a preference for large, visible projects to the detriment
of those that are less conspicuous, but more likely to produce results.223  En-
couraging needed innovation is not simply a matter of dedicating resources
to those endeavors favored by scientists and technologists.  Even the most
educated and well-intentioned experts may focus their energies in the wrong
direction.  Indeed, as noted above, it is the unexpected nature of many inno-
vations that makes them so valuable.224
Prizes, like patents, impose the relevant R&D costs of the invention on
the inventors.  Prize sponsors only pay for an inventor’s work if she is ulti-
mately successful.225  Unsuccessful innovators, and their sponsors, are left to
bear their R&D costs themselves.  This has clear fiscal benefits for the gov-
ernment, and taxpayers.226  If R&D is funded ex ante, there is no assurance
that the investment will produce any benefits to the funder at all.227  With
prizes, on the other hand, the financial payment is conditional upon the prize
conditions being fulfilled.  Provided the prize is properly designed — and a
would-be innovator succeeds — the funder gets its money’s worth.
With any directed R&D program, there is a risk that the wrong target or
goal is selected.  This can be a problem with prizes or grants.  Yet in the case
of prizes, the financial risk is borne by each of those inventors who is seek-
220 See LINDA COHEN & ROGER NOLL, THE TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 365–69 (1991).
Richard G. Newell, confirmed in 2009 as head of the Energy Information Administration in
the Department of Energy, characterized the Synfuels Corporation as a failure. See Newell,
supra note 194, at 6. R
221 See Michael Hart, The Chimera of Industrial Policy: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,
19 CAN - U.S. L.J. 19, 38 (1993).
222 See COHEN & NOLL, supra note 220, at 378; see also Ronald J. Sutherland & Jerry R
Taylor, Time to Overhaul Federal Energy R&D, POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 424, Cato Institute, Feb.
7, 2002, at 6.
223 See Newell, supra note 194, at 18; COHEN & NOLL, supra note 220, at 370. R
224 See supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text. R
225 In the case of patents, on the other hand, the costs of developing successful innovations
are passed through to consumers. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 34–39. R
226 As Scotchmer notes, “When innovations are funded out of general revenue, there is no
guarantee that the benefits received by any individual taxpayer outweigh that taxpayer’s share
of the cost,” if, that is, the funding generates any innovation benefits at all. See SCOTCHMER,
supra note 67, at 38. R
227 Contrary to some claims, it is unclear how much government science and R&D fund-
ing directly contribute to economic growth. See Julia Lane, Assessing the Impact of Science
Funding, 324 SCI. 1273, 1273 (2009).
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ing the prize, and it is not borne by the funder.  Moreover, the potential for
there to be multiple groups seeking the same prize serves to lessen the risk
for the prize funder.  In effect, a prize system diversifies the risk and reduces
the likelihood that the funder’s resources are wasted.228
While even failed research projects may have value — learning what
doesn’t work is often important, and may lead to unintended discoveries —
government grants on dead-end technologies may result in substantial wastes
of taxpayer dollars.  For example, NASA gave over $900 million to Lock-
heed Martin to develop the X-33, a component of the next-generation space
vehicle, only to see the program canceled due to a fuel tank problem.229  In
this instance, the taxpayer was out almost $1 billion with little to show for it.
The failure of a research investment to produce a viable technological inno-
vation does not necessarily mean that the investment was wasted,230 and dis-
covering what doesn’t work can be as important as discovering what
works.231  Nonetheless, because of fiscal limitations on government R&D
funding, it is worth focusing taxpayer dollars in ways that maximize the
likelihood of a positive return.
Energy policy is typically quite politicized, and energy subsidies are no
exception.  Government grant-making is inevitably subject to political pres-
sures by politicians and interest groups seeking funding for their particular
projects.  Grants are often dispersed on political criteria, rewarding large,
politically connected incumbent firms, rather than innovative upstarts.232  In
the case of the SynFuels program, fuel cell projects were “allotted to each of
the 50 states, regardless of economic viability.”233  This may have bolstered
political support for the program, but it did nothing to make the underlying
investments worthwhile.
228 As Hanson notes, “Standard principal-agent theory suggests that paying for results is
attractive when the principal can more easily specify the results she prefers, when the principal
is more risk averse, and when agents can take more risks and have more access to capital.
Paying for effort, on the other hand, is attractive when the principal can more cheaply monitor
effort, when she knows better whom to hire, and when the principal can take more risks.” See
Hanson, supra note 111, at 4. R
229 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 7. R
230 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 55 (“ex post regret does not mean that an invest- R
ment was ex ante inefficient.”).
231 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 301 (2003) (stating “research expenditures of the losers of the
race may not be wasted” because they “will generate information that the losers may be able
to use in other projects”); see also Arrow et al., supra note 60, at 2 (“Government R&D R
should encourage more risk-taking and tolerate failures that could provide valuable
information.”).
232 See generally COHEN & NOLL, supra note 220, at 53–71 (discussing political influence R
on research expenditures).
233 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY: BUILDING A
NEW ALLIANCE 59 (1992).
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It is not uncommon for political leaders to overrule expert determina-
tions of what types of projects should, or should not, get funded.234  Grant
programs seek to avoid this problem through the institution of various proce-
dures, including peer-review.  Yet even the most educated and well-inten-
tioned experts may focus their energies in the wrong direction.  As Cohen
and Noll concluded:
The overriding lesson from the case studies is that the goal of eco-
nomic efficiency — to cure market failures in privately sponsored
commercial innovation — is so severely constrained by political
forces that an effective, coherent national commercial R&D pro-
gram has never been put in place.235
Political considerations could influence prize criteria, but the risk of political
interference is substantially less.  A government official can see who is re-
ceiving an ex ante grant, whereas the likely recipient of an ex post prize is
uncertain.  It is difficult to predict, let alone ensure, that a prize for an as-yet-
undeveloped innovation will go to a politically preferred recipient.
Prizes do not create the same incentives among reward seekers as gov-
ernment research grants may among grant seekers.  Specifically, those seek-
ing government grants may have an incentive to exaggerate the potential of
their projects and, once funding is obtained, may have an incentive to divert
resources and slow the rate of achievement so as to lay the groundwork for
obtaining future grants.236  Whereas prizes and patent protection are some-
what self-enforcing, because researchers will not be rewarded unless they
focus their efforts on promising subjects of research, grants are not.237
To their detriment, the same characteristics that make innovation prizes
so effective discourage their use by politicians.  Grant programs empower
government officials to dole out funds to favored constituencies and institu-
tional insiders.  Even where efforts are made to insulate the decision making
process, grant-making officials are influenced by knowledge of who will
receive grant support, and the grants go out whether or not a grant recipient
delivers or a problem is solved.  Prize money, on the other hand, is only paid
out if someone fulfills the preset conditions and is available to all comers,
irrespective of their political influence or institutional connections.  Indeed,
234 For example, the synthetic fuels program invested in projects involving high-sulfur
eastern coal for political reasons, even though low-sulfur western coal was more promising.
See COHEN & NOLL, supra note 220, at 368. R
235 Id. at 378.
236 MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE: CREATING INCEN-
TIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES 49 (2004) (“Researchers
funded on the basis of an outsiders’ [sic] assessment of potential rather than actual product
delivery have incentives to exaggerate the prospects that their approach will succeed, and once
they are funded, may even have incentives to divert resources away from the search for the
desired product.”); see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 248. R
237 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 67, at 247 (With grants, “the whole point is to reimburse R
costs before they are incurred.”).
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as with the longitude prize, the reward may go to an innovation disfavored
by political and scientific elites.
It bears repeating, however, that prizes are not without their drawbacks.
Most notably, prize systems require researchers to obtain funding for their
research up front.  For some types of research, particularly where expensive
equipment is required, this can create a significant obstacle.  Prizes are also
not particularly well-suited to situations in which the funding authority can-
not articulate clear criteria upon which the prize would be awarded.  For this
reason, prizes are not as useful for the funding of basic research.  In the
climate change context, however, there is a need for practical innovations
that are commercially viable.  This makes prizes particularly well suited for
the climate policy challenge.
V. INNOVATION AND REGULATION
Thus far, this article has focused on government funding of scientific
and technological research as the primary means to induce greater innova-
tion for climate change policy.  What about regulatory alternatives?  Govern-
mental regulation is the conventional approach to environmental pollution
problems.238  Historically this has meant command-and-control regulation.
In recent decades, there has been increasing interest in, and occasional use
of, market-oriented mechanisms such as tradable pollution allowances or
“cap and trade.”239  Regulation of some sort to address the control of GHG
is almost inevitable.240  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has au-
thority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),241 and
recently promulgated regulations to limit such emissions from motor vehi-
cles and the largest stationary source emitters.242  Legislation passed by the
House of Representatives would create a cap and trade regime for GHG
emissions and impose a wide range of climate-related regulations, including
238 See Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection,
24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2001) (discussing the conventional approach to environ-
mental protection in contrast to an alternative paradigm).
239 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks through Economic In-
centives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988) (discussing theoretical merits of market mecha-
nisms).  For an example of market mechanisms in use, see Clean Air Act §§ 401–416, 42
U.S.C. §7651 (2006) (Acid Depositions Control and Emissions Trading).
240 See Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 63, 75 (May 21, 2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
241 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007).
242 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Sec-
tion 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. Ch.1); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25323 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
85, 86, and 600, 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–538); Prevention of Significant Deterioration
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31513 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts 51, 52, 70, and 71).
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renewable portfolio standards for utilities, appliance efficiency standards,
and requirements for building codes and land-use planning.243
While regulation will be one of the tools used to try to address global
climate change, it is doubtful that regulation alone will be sufficient.244  Even
aggressive regulatory measures are unlikely to set a path toward atmospheric
stabilization.245  Regulatory mandates can only do so much if the necessary
technologies are not ready to be deployed.  Whatever the other virtues of
traditional and market-oriented regulatory approaches for controlling tradi-
tional (non-GHG) pollution sources, they are unlikely to stimulate the level
of technological innovation necessary to achieve dramatic reductions in
GHG emissions over the near- to medium-term.246  Regulatory requirements
can certainly assist with technology diffusion and accelerate the adoption
and refinement of technologies that have already been discovered and devel-
oped.  Yet such measures are unlikely to spur investment in technological
breakthroughs.  In some cases, the premature adoption of regulatory stan-
dards could even be counterproductive.
Whereas prizes have spurred dramatic technological breakthroughs, as
with navigation and food preservation,247 there is little empirical evidence
that regulations are a reliable method of encouraging technological innova-
tion, particularly revolutionary breakthroughs of the sort necessary to ad-
dress climate change.248  What evidence there is suggests that regulatory
strategies are more likely to produce incremental innovations than break-
throughs, and that market-oriented instruments will be more effective than
traditional command-and-control regulation.249  Regulations are more suited
to incremental technological change and the diffusion of preexisting innova-
tions.  If a given technology exists, a regulatory mandate may expand its use.
Yet mandating environmental improvements produces inconsistent and unre-
243 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (as
passed by H.R., June 26, 2009).
244 See Arrow et al., supra note 60, at 3 (“Mandates and subsidies aimed at supporting the R
deployment of relatively mature technologies are unlikely to be cost-effective tools for elicit-
ing the major reductions of greenhouse gas emissions that now appear to be called for.”);
Hoffert et al., supra note 33, at 986 (“[T]he fossil fuel greenhouse effect is an energy problem R
that cannot be simply regulated away.”).
245 See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. R
246 See Hahn, supra note 50, at 580 (observing that neither mandated standards nor subsi- R
dies are “particularly well-suited for generating cost-effective innovation addressing the prob-
lem of climate change”).
247 See supra Part III.
248 See Adam Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Policy and
Technological Change, 22 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 41, 55 (2002); David E. Adelman, Climate
Change, Federalism, and Promoting Technological Change, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 209–11 (Alyson C.
Flournoy & David M. Driesen eds., 2010).
249 See Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 248, at 55. But see Margaret R. Taylor, Ed- R
ward S. Rubin & David A. Hounshell, Regulation as the Mother of Invention: The Case of SO2
Control, 27 LAW & POL’Y 348, 370 (2005) (finding no evidence that emissions trading under
the Clean Air Act of 1990 induced greater technological innovation than traditional
regulation).
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liable incentives for technological innovation.  As former EPA Administrator
Carol Browner has observed, the “traditional regulatory path” can only pro-
duce innovation that is “incremental at best” because the “current regula-
tory system is about going from A to B to C.”  But what is necessary today
to address global climate change is “going from A to Z.”250
Using traditional regulatory tools to drive technological innovation re-
quires detailed knowledge about the desired course of technological change
and what sorts of innovations are likely or foreseeable.  Yet government reg-
ulators rarely have the necessary information or foresight to drive innovation
in this way.251  While government regulators “can typically assume that
some amount of improvement over existing technology will always be feasi-
ble, it is impossible to know how much.”252  As Arrow et al. observe,
“[r]egulators can find it difficult to obtain information about the status of
technologies that is accurate enough to allow them to set standards that both
can be achieved and will induce real innovation.”253  Even if regulators were
to identify a proper target initially, the regulatory process changes so slowly
that regulatory standards would be unlikely to keep up with technological
change or account for new information.
It is one thing for the government to require (or subsidize) the adoption
of a new technology to force its diffusion throughout an industry, but quite
another to mandate production or pollution improvements that have yet to be
achieved.254  Government regulators “have a relatively poor record in pick-
ing which future technologies will best succeed in achieving a particular
objective.”255  This has been as true with regulatory efforts to spur innova-
tion along a certain path as it has been with traditional research subsidies,
and for the same reasons: government officials, even those with the benefit
of specialized technical knowledge, lack the foresight necessary to predict
technological progress and the future path of innovation.256
250 Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (1995)
(quoting Carol Browner).
251 See Hahn, supra note 50, at 580 (“The regulator typically lacks the kind of information R
needed to set standards appropriately for forcing innovation.”); Marchant, supra note 36, at R
836 (“[I]t is difficult to predict the ingenious and creative innovations” that scientists and
inventors might develop).
252 Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 248, at 50. R
253 Arrow et al., supra note 60, at 3. R
254 See Hahn supra note 50, at 580 (“Standards may be effective in limited situations R
where the technological solution is reasonably clear, but they are unlikely to result in major
breakthroughs.”).
255 Marchant, supra note 36, at 836. R
256 Gustavo Collantes & Daniel Sperling, The Origin of California’s Zero Emission Vehi-
cle Mandate, 42 TRANS. RES. PART A 1302, 1307 (2008) (“Uncertainty is . . . an inherent
characteristic of technology-forcing approaches, as regulators do not know how much innova-
tion industry is capable of achieving, and industry is reluctant to provide such information
(even if they knew).”); Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 19, at 477 (“while regulators can R
typically assume that some amount of improvement over existing technology will always be
feasible, it is impossible to know how much.  Standards must either be made unambitious, or
else run the risk of being ultimately unachievable, leading to great political and economic
disruption.”); Marchant, supra note 36, at 836. R
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California’s failed effort to mandate the sale of electric vehicles in the
1990s demonstrates the difficulty of trying to use regulatory mandates to
force technological innovation.257  California regulators and others believed
that sufficiently stringent regulatory requirements would induce automakers
to develop commercially marketable electric cars.  In September 1990, the
California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) adopted a Low Emission Vehicle
(“LEV”) program that, among other things, required each automaker selling
passenger vehicles within the state to ensure that those vehicles sold met a
stringent average emissions standard.258  The original mandate also required
automakers to “make available for sale” vehicles that would qualify as
“zero emission,” such as electric cars.259  Specifically, automakers were re-
quired to ensure that Zero Emission Vehicles (“ZEVs”) accounted for at
least two percent of vehicles sold in 1998-2000, and ever increasing shares
in subsequent years.260  The program was intended to be technology-forcing,
but CARB believed the mandates were achievable.261  As it turned out, how-
ever, CARB was overly optimistic about its cost estimates and the pace at
which battery technology would improve.262
As the deadline for the ZEV mandate approached, CARB began to real-
ize that there was no way for automakers to meet the target.  Consumers
were not willing to purchase a sufficient number of electric vehicles, even if
sold at a loss, to satisfy the sales mandate.263  Anticipated breakthroughs in
257 See id. at 838.
258 See Collantes & Sperling, supra note 256, at 1304, 1309–10. R
259 For an overview of the California Zero Emissions Vehicles (“ZEV”) mandate, see
Collantes & Sperling, supra note 256.  Though referred to as “Zero Emission Vehicles,” elec- R
tric cars are not truly emission free.  The generation of electricity to charge the vehicle battery
can be a substantial source of emissions. See Michael Moyer, The Dirty Truth about Plug-In
Hybrids, SCI. AMER., July 2010, at 54.  In some parts of the country, the use of plug-in electric
vehicles will actually result in greater net emissions of carbon dioxide than traditional hybrid
vehicles. Id. Electric vehicles are also not necessarily “zero emission” in terms of direct
vehicle emissions.  Due to the need to operate vehicles in colder temperatures in Northern
California, in 1993 CARB issued a waiver to allow automakers to equip electric vehicles with
gasoline or diesel-powered heaters without losing their “ZEV” status. See Oscar Suris, Cold
Weather Is Still a Problem In Electric Cars, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1994, at B1.  The program
also included requirements for fuel content.  Insofar as the oil industry opposed the CARB
policy, it opposed the fuel mandates and ignored the ZEV requirement. See Collantes & Sper-
ling, supra note 256, at 1310. R
260 Under the original mandate, ZEVs had to account for five percent of vehicles sold in
2001 and 2002 and ten percent in 2003 and thereafter.  Collantes & Sperling, supra note 256, R
at 1304.
261 See id. at 1307.
262 Among other things, CARB’s estimates of the costs of operating battery-powered vehi-
cles did not include the costs of home-recharging equipment. Id.  CARB’s cost estimates were
also substantially lower than those of other economic analysts. See KAY H. JONES &
JONATHAN H. ADLER, CATO INST., TIME TO REOPEN THE CLEAN AIR ACT 9–10 (1995).  Inter-
estingly enough, CARB may have only been following the lead of then-General Motors
(“GM”) CEO Roger Smith who also presented an overly optimistic view of GM’s electric car
prototype, the “Impact.” See Collantes & Sperling, supra note 256, at 1306. R
263 GM’s optimistic projections were that the Impact could account for 0.5% of its Califor-
nia vehicle sales, only one quarter of the CARB mandate.  Collantes & Sperling, supra note
256, at 1308.  One study, financed by two automakers, found that consumers would not R
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battery technology did not materialize.264  As a consequence, CARB made
repeated revisions to the ZEV mandate, delaying the date at which sales
mandates would take effect.265  In effect, CARB shifted the requirement from
a specific technology mandate to a more flexible performance goal.266  This
was fortunate, as automakers ended up using a different technology to meet
the LEV requirement.267  Regulators had been wrong in their assessment of
automakers’ ability to produce commercially viable electric vehicles, yet
they caused the diversion of substantial private and public funds in pursuit of
this aim.
Regulatory measures, particularly those focused on the adoption of
technologies, often have compliance periods that are too short to induce
large-scale innovation or significant technological breakthroughs.268  The
regulatory environment can also generate uncertainty that further discour-
ages investments in technological innovation.269  Longer-term investments in
innovation require credible and stable commitments, which traditional envi-
ronmental regulation may undermine.  Insofar as governmental commit-
ments to future levels of regulation are of “questionable credibility,” this
diminishes the incentives for innovation that environmental regulations
could otherwise provide.270
In some instances, the premature imposition of stringent regulatory re-
quirements could actually inhibit or retard the rate of technological innova-
purchase electric vehicles over traditional gasoline vehicles unless they were $28,000 cheaper,
and yet electric vehicles were (and still are) substantially more expensive than gasoline-pow-
ered vehicles. See James R. Healey, California May Soften Electric Car Mandate, USA TO-
DAY, June 2, 2000, at 3B; see also Stuart F. Brown, It’s the Battery, Stupid!, POPULAR SCI.,
Feb. 1995, at 62 (arguing that batteries for electric vehicles “aren’t ready for prime time”);
Lawrence M. Fisher, California is Backing Off Mandate for Electric Car, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1995, at A14 (noting the view of “some automobile experts” that “current electric cars fall
short on performance, range, or both”).
264 Indeed, even in 2010 it is not clear that battery technology is sufficient to capture a
significant portion of the vehicle market.  The newly released Volt from GM is, by some
accounts, “a vehicle that costs $41,000 but offers the performance and interior space of a
$15,000 economy car.”  Edward Niedermeyer, G.M.’s Electric Lemon, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2010, at A23; see also JUDE ANDERSON & CURTIS D. ANDERSON, ELECTRIC AND HYBRID CARS
161 (2005) (noting limits of battery technology); ANDRES DINGER ET AL., BOSTON CONSULTA-
TION GROUP, BATTERIES FOR ELECTRIC CARS: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE OUT-
LOOK TO 2020 (2010) (same), available at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file36615.pdf.
265 In 1996, CARB removed the initial “ramp up” ZEV sales requirement.  In 1998, it
agreed to offer automakers credit toward the ZEV mandate for sales of extremely clean vehi-
cles.  In 2001 it expanded the credit for non-ZEVs further, and then made additional revisions
(some in response to litigation) in 2003. See Zero-Emission Vehicle Legal and Regulatory
Activities – Background, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/
zevprog/background.htm (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
266 See Marchant, supra note 36, at 837–38. R
267 See id. at 838.
268 See Arrow et al., supra note 60, at 3. R
269 See Newell, supra note 194, at 15–16 (noting research showing that changing regula- R
tory conditions and uncertainty can dampen private sector investment in technological
innovation).
270 See Marchant, supra note 36, at 848. R
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tion.271  By increasing the costs of modifying and enhancing existing
industrial facilities, and the costs of replacing older, dirtier facilities with
newer, cleaner ones, pollution-control regulations may work at cross-pur-
poses with the goal of developing cleaner and more energy-efficient means
of production.  This is a well-documented problem with regulations that
grandfather existing facilities.  Laws that grandfather older facilities can cre-
ate substantial disincentives to the development and adoption of newer,
cleaner technologies.272  Yet grandfathering is difficult to avoid politically, as
the effect of regulatory measures on existing facilities is of greater political
concern than the effect of regulations on facilities not yet built.  As a conse-
quence, regulations often protect incumbent firms.
Technology-based standards, in particular, can “play a key role in dis-
couraging innovation,” as they can result in the locking-in of an administra-
tively anointed technology, thereby discouraging efforts to develop more
advanced alternatives.273  According to a 1995 report of the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (“OTA”), “[r]egulations that are overly prescriptive can
lock in existing technologies to the detriment of other technologies that
might meet or exceed requirements.”274  If a regulation embraces a given
technological approach to meeting a given target, there is little incentive to
develop alternatives or improve upon the technology.275  As a consequence,
“technology-based standards provide the weakest incentives for both abate-
ment technology and output technology innovation.”276  Yet even perform-
ance-based standards can discourage innovation as such standards may rest
upon established reference technologies in order to facilitate implementation
and enforcement.  As OTA concluded, “[i]n such cases, companies and reg-
271 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY IN-
NOVATION AND USE 6 (1998) (noting potential for environmental regulation to create “signifi-
cant barriers to innovation”) [hereinafter BARRIERS].
272 U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERG-
ING TECHNOLOGIES 87 (1995) (“Regulatory systems that grandfather existing facilities may
dissuade investments in new or upgraded technologies if such changes trigger more stringent
standards or lengthy permitting processes.”).
273 BARRIERS, supra note 271, at 7.  This report further explains: “Emission limits or dis- R
charge standards based on a single best technology create practical barriers to innovation by
limiting permissible technologies to available ones that meet the standard.  This requirement
precludes the normal development and refinement process most technologies need to achieve
their best performance and, in many cases, can limit permissible technologies to a single one.”
Id.; see also Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 248, at 50 (“Technology standards are partic- R
ularly problematic, since they tend to freeze the development of technologies that might other-
wise result in greater levels of control.”).
274 U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERG-
ING TECHNOLOGIES 87–88 (1995) [hereinafter OTA].
275 Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 248, at 50; Adam B. Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, R
Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instru-
ments on Technology Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 43, 46 (1995) (“Once a per-
formance standard has been satisfied, there may be little benefit to developing and/or adopting
even cleaner technology.”).
276 Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 4, 21 (1979).
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ulators are likely to prefer reference technologies they are confident will
meet standards, rather than innovative approaches that are less certain.”277
The broader effects of regulation on innovation in a given sector are
also important to consider.  Insofar as GHG emission regulations lead to a
reduction in fossil fuel use, they may actually reduce the incentive to de-
velop technologies to reduce emissions from such fuel sources.278  Specifi-
cally, if emission-control policies put a price on carbon, and fossil fuel use
declines, the relative incentive to make fossil fuel use more efficient will
decline as well.279
Market-based regulatory approaches are likely to be more effective at
encouraging technological innovation than command-and-control regula-
tions, insofar as such instruments leave regulated firms substantial flexibility
in meeting emission targets or other requirements.280  Yet there is little evi-
dence that even market-oriented instruments can produce more than incre-
mental improvements.  The CAA’s acid rain program, for instance, is widely
credited with achieving substantial pollution reductions at a relatively low
cost, yet it does not appear to have spurred much innovation.281  The targets
imposed under that program were “well within the range of capabilities of
existing technology,” and thus did more to encourage diffusion than
innovation.282
In theory, the imposition of a carbon tax or other price mechanism on
GHG emissions could be sufficient to spur greater levels of technological
innovation.  If the tax could be set at a level equal to the social costs ex-
pected to result from climate change, then firms would have an incentive to
develop cost-effective means of reducing GHG emissions.283  Yet such a tax
277 OTA, supra note 274, at 88. R
278 See Joshua S. Gans, Innovation and Climate Change Policy 1 (Apr. 27, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/joshuagans/24.
279 See Gans, supra note 278, at 2.  As regulations reduce overall economic activity, they R
could further offset the incentive to develop emission-reducing technologies. See id. at 3
(“Even if socially beneficial, climate change policy reduces the size of the ‘real’ economy and
hence, may reduce the overall rate of innovation.”); see also Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra
note 19, at 474 (“To the extent that regulation inhibits investment and/or slows productivity R
growth, this can be viewed as indirect evidence suggesting that induced innovation effects are
either small or are outweighed by other costs of regulation.”).
280 See Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 19, at 477 (noting that market-based instru- R
ments provide greater incentives and opportunity for innovation than performance standards
which provide greater incentives than technology standards). But see Popp, supra note 23, at R
284 (citing research questioning whether market-based instruments induce greater innovation
than command-and-control regulations).
281 See David M. Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, in BEYOND ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW: POLICY PROPSOALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 175–76 (Alyson C.
Flournoy & David M. Driesen eds., 2010).
282 Lane, supra note 227, at 3; see also Anne E. Smith, Jeremy Platt & A. Denny Eller- R
man, The Costs of Reducing SO2 Emissions – Not as Low as You Might Think (Ctr. for
Energy and Envtl. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 98010, 1998).
283 As Nobel laureate economist Ronald Coase noted, setting a tax at a level equal to the
social costs of pollution “would require a detailed knowledge of individual preferences,” and
it is unclear “how the data for such a taxation system could be assembled.”  R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 41 (1960).
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is unlikely.  Even assuming that governments possess the level of informa-
tion to set the tax at the proper Pigouvian level,284 such a tax would not be
viable politically.  For the same reason that legislatures will not adopt more
stringent regulatory measures, there is no possibility that a sufficiently high
tax would be set.  Therefore, even if such a tax would provide sufficient
incentives for technological innovation, such a tax will not be adopted.
If anything, greater technological innovation is a necessary predicate to
the adoption of either more stringent regulatory requirements or an optimal
tax regime.  Insofar as technological innovation reduces the costs of emis-
sion reductions, it will blunt the political opposition to such measures.  Just
as the development of CFC substitutes made adoption of the CFC phase-out
a political possibility,285 so too will the development of low-cost means to
reduce GHG emissions or remove carbon from the atmosphere make more
stringent climate policies a political possibility.  So rather than relying upon
regulation to induce technological innovation, it may be worth focusing on
technological innovation as a means of facilitating greater regulation.
VI. A PRIZE PROPOSAL
Richard Branson and other private individuals may continue to offer
technological inducement prizes for climate-related innovations.  These
prize awards could be important, but they are unlikely to produce the degree
of technological innovation necessary to achieve current climate policy goals
in a cost-effective manner.  Encouraging the desired level of innovation will
require far more.  Thomas Kalil believes that the federal government should
offer $100-200 million annually in prize awards for innovations in zero-
energy building design, reductions in urban GHG emissions, and more fuel
efficient vehicles.286  Yet even this could be insufficient.  If one uses the
potential social benefits of averting climate change as the benchmark, the
investment in technological innovation should be far greater.
The federal government currently spends approximately $3 billion an-
nually on R&D of climate-related technologies.287  The U.S. Climate Change
Technology Program (“USCCTP”) funds research efforts into technological
improvements that could potentially be achieved in the near, medium, and
284 Noted economist A.C. Pigou proposed the imposition of taxes equivalent to the social
costs imposed by polluting or other externality-generating activities.  Even assuming that gov-
ernmental agencies have the necessary information to set pollution taxes at such an ideal level,
Ronald Coase showed that such taxes do not necessarily enhance economic efficiency. See
Coase, supra note 283, at 42 (“[E]ven if the tax is exactly adjusted to equal the damage that R
would be done to neighboring properties as a result of the emission of each additional puff of
smoke, the tax would not necessarily bring about optimal conditions.”).
285 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. R
286 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 9. R
287 See USCCTP, supra note 4, at 207 (noting FY 2006 funding of “nearly $3 billion”). R
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long term.288  Projects range from vehicle and building design to fuel cell
technology, agricultural methods, and carbon sequestration technologies.289
Assuming current funding levels continue, the federal government will
spend approximately $30 billion on climate-related technologies over the
next decade.  If the federal government committed one-third of USCCTP
funding — either reallocating it from traditional R&D or augmenting it with
a new revenue source — it would have sufficient resources to endow a series
of substantial climate prizes.  With $10 billion over ten years, the USCCTP,
or another agency such as ARPA-E, could endow prizes across the range of
technologies that the USCCTP has identified as priorities for climate change
policy.  This amount is significantly less than the estimated potential social
welfare losses of climate change, and yet would substantially increase the
incentives for needed technological innovation.
Due to the potential for prize awards to spur greater levels of private
research, as occurred with the Ansari X-Prize, reallocation of USCCTP
funding in this way would produce a substantial increase in overall invest-
ment into climate-friendly technologies.290  Equally important, the announce-
ment of prizes of this magnitude would draw additional attention to the need
for climate-related research and increase the prestige of developing climate-
related technologies.  A high-profile government investment in prizes would
underscore the importance of climate-friendly technological innovation.291
Developing specific prize criteria is particularly important.292  The
USCCTP’s matrix of technological goals and projected time frames for de-
velopment could serve as the basis for prize specifications, but would need
to be refined if used for prizes instead of traditional R&D.  Either the
USCCTP or some other entity, such as the NAS or the NAE, could assemble
an expert panel of researchers, scientists, and engineers to identify which
technological goals are most suited to the use of prizes.  Such a panel would
also have to devote considerable time to developing prize specifications with
sufficient detail to ensure that winning innovations would be worth the pub-
lic investment but with enough flexibility so as not to preclude new ways of
288 The USCCTP defines “near-term” as less than 20 years, “mid-term” as 20–40 years,
and “long-term” as more than 40 years. Id. at 211.
289 Id.
290 It is also possible that the creation of prizes would not require an equal offset of ex-
isting USCCTP funding, as prize awards would not be paid out unless and until the necessary
innovations were developed and proven.
291 See MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 21–22 (discussing potential for prizes to change R
public perception and the ability of prizes to focus a community’s efforts on a specific
problem).
292 X-Prize Foundation Chairman and CEO Peter Diamandis testified before Congress that
“writing the rules is more than 80% of the battle.” NASA Contests and Prizes: How Can They
Help Advance Space Exploration?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space and Aeronautics
of the H. Comm. on Sci., 108th Cong. 29 (2004) (statement of Dr. Peter H. Diamandis, Chair-
man & CEO, X-Prize Foundation).
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solving existing problems.293  It is also important that prize criteria are clear
and objectively measurable.294  The panel would also have to determine the
size of prize awards and whether there would be multiple or shared awards
in any given area.  In some cases, structuring prizes to divide awards propor-
tionately may increase entry rates and generate additional innovation.295
The recent NAS report on the NSF’s prospective use of innovation in-
ducement prizes reviewed many of the prospective implementation ques-
tions for government administered prize program.296  Among other things,
the NAS stressed the need to design prizes around objectively measurable
outcomes and endorsed “first past the post” prizes with set time limits.297
The NAS also recommended that the federal government should not seek to
own, control, or influence the disposition of intellectual property resulting
from a prize competition, unless the winner does not seek to commercialize
resulting innovations within a reasonable time period.298  The NAS suggested
the possibility that prize awards include a stipulation requiring good faith
efforts to commercialize resulting innovations or even forced licensing, but
urged against requiring that such intellectual property be made available at
no cost or on concessional terms.299
It would also be important to examine whether additional incentives
would need to be created to encourage diffusion of the relevant technology.
One possibility would be for prizes to include advance market commitments,
through which a government commits in advance to purchase a given quan-
tity of an innovation that meets predetermined characteristics.300  So, for in-
stance, the federal government could commit to purchase a given number of
automobiles that meet or exceed a given fuel efficiency or emissions-per-
mile standard, creating additional incentives to translate new inventions into
commercially viable products.
As the OMB noted in 2010, federal agencies, including the Department
of Energy, already have some ability to fund technology inducement prizes
out of existing appropriations.  However, it would be a mistake to leave
prizes to the administrative process.  The same political pressures that can
distort traditional R&D funding are likely to discourage the diversion of
funds from R&D grant programs to prizes.  Without a direct statutory man-
293 See MCKINSEY, supra note 73, at 39–45 (discussing the goal setting process for prize R
competitions).
294 Id. at 54 (noting “objectivity and simplicity are the biggest challenges” in drafting
prize criteria).
295 See Timothy N. Cason, William A. Masters & Roman M. Sheremeta, Entry Into Win-
ner-Take-All and Proportional Prize Contests: An Experimental Study, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 604
(2010).
296 See NAT’L ACAD OF SCI., supra note 72, at 18–39. R
297 Id. at 21.
298 Id. at 33.
299 Id.
300 See Kalil, supra note 71, at 5. R
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date, agencies are more likely to talk about prize competitions than they are
to implement them.301
Congress should mandate that specific agencies develop prizes and
specify the minimum degree of funding such prizes should receive out of
agency appropriations.  Congress should also identify, in broad terms, the
purposes for which prizes should be used, as well as to require the appoint-
ment of outside expert panels to assist in the prize development process.
Directed statutory authorization of this sort could ensure that agencies pur-
sue the potential of prizes to assist with the climate change challenge.  It
would also further underscore that climate-friendly technological innovation
is a national priority.
CONCLUSION
Prizes are no panacea.302  Indeed, barring some serendipitous discovery,
there is no panacea for the climate policy challenge.  Yet technology induce-
ment prizes offer a relatively low-cost way to encourage greater innovation
than traditional grant-based R&D funding.  In order to encourage greater
levels of technological innovation, it would also be desirable to reduce ex-
isting regulatory barriers to the development and deployment of alternative
technologies, as well as to place a price on carbon, ideally with a simple and
straightforward carbon tax.  Combined with prizes, such measures could cre-
ate a more favorable environment for climate-friendly innovation.  Yet with-
out prizes, or some other enhanced incentive for technological innovation,
the necessary technological breakthroughs are much less likely to
materialize.
Prizes have a peculiar virtue of imposing costs only to the extent they
produce results, so there is room to be ambitious.  Assuming the worst cli-
mate policy scenarios only strengthens the case for large climate policy
prizes.  Rather than funding ten who will try, the government needs to re-
ward only the one who succeeds.  As the patent system demonstrates, the
hope of a large financial windfall is a powerful inducement for innovation.
There has been substantial interest in prizes in recent years but not much
action.  Now it is time to up the ante for climate innovation with federally
funded climate prizes.
301 Although the NAE recommended consideration of prizes in 1999, the NSF did not
consider using prizes until required to by federal statute many years later. See NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCI., supra note 72, at 11. R
302 See Mowery, Nelson & Martin, supra note 203, at 1021 (noting potential drawbacks of R
inducement prizes in the energy context); see also infra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. R
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